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  INTRODUCTION   
Much like federalism itself, U.S. energy policy relies heavi-
ly on the coordination of state and local governments. Building 
new high-voltage transmission lines is essential for large-scale 
energy projects such as wind turbine farms and solar thermal 
facilities—and increasingly also is necessary for large-scale en-
ergy storage. But each state controls its own project approval 
process through agency siting and judicial eminent domain pro-
ceedings,
1
 so any project spanning multiple jurisdictions de-
pends on the coordination of multiple states. Most states grant 
their public utility commissions (PUCs) authority to review and 
 
 1. In previous work we each have focused on legal aspects of electric 
power transmission line siting. See, e.g., Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting 
Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the “Public In-
terest” in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 
705 (2010) (highlighting how state public utility laws tend to embrace a nar-
row definition of “public interest” in siting proceedings); Alexandra B. Klass, 
The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach to Siting Transmis-
sion Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895 (2015) (suggesting options for creating 
regional authority for transmission line siting); Alexandra B. Klass, Takings 
and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079 (2013) (addressing mismatch between 
some state eminent domain laws and state preferences for energy develop-
ment); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission 
Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
1801 (2012) (highlighting the need for process preemption and additional fed-
eral encouragement for states to join regional efforts to address transmission); 
Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. 
L. 1015 (2009) (arguing that focus on expanding federal transmission siting 
authority is misplaced, given the need of federal regulators to address other 
issues such as energy efficiency and cost allocation in operation of the grid). 
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approve transmission lines based on a determination of wheth-
er there is a “need” for the line, alternatives to the line, and the 
potential environmental impacts of the line. If successful, the 
line receives a certificate of need, sometimes also called a “cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity.” For example, a 
transmission line connecting proposed wind turbines in Wyo-
ming to export power supply to customers in California must 
pass through and seek regulatory approvals in at least two oth-
er states.
2
 States also play the primary role in the approval of 
interstate oil pipelines, as reflected by Nebraska’s longstanding 
objections to the location of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline.
3
  
Though some national interest in connecting the supply 
and demand of energy across jurisdictions seems obvious, exist-
ing law allows a state regulator to reject an electric transmis-
sion line or oil pipeline proposal for almost any reason—
including, at the extreme, anticompetitive or protectionist mo-
tivations.
4
 State or local decision makers have rejected project 
applications outright where regulators determine that local 
firms or consumers will not benefit.
5
 In some instances, a state 
or local agency regulator can lack statutory authorization to 
even consider an application from a non-local project develop-
er.
6
 For example, in approving a 500-mile, $2 billion “Rock Is-
land Clean Line” electric transmission project to allow wind 
 
 2. See Rebecca Smith & Michael Calia, Companies Propose $8 Billion 
Green-Energy Project for California, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2014, 5:23 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-propose-8-billion-green-energy-plan-for 
-los-angeles-1411478019. 
 3. Most recently, following much back and forth between the Nebraska 
governor, legislature, and courts, the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected a con-
stitutional challenge to the state’s oil pipeline siting and approval process on 
standing grounds but, after the TransCanada filed eminent domain proceed-
ings, landowners filed a new lawsuit challenging the law. See Thompson v. 
Heineman, 857 N.W.2d 731 (Neb. 2015); Grant Schulte, Nebraska Opponents 
of Keystone XL Oil Pipeline Reignite Legal Fight, STAR TRIB. (Sept. 29, 2015), 
http://www.startribune.com/keystone-xl-developer-drops-landowner-lawsuits 
-in-nebraska/330005521/. 
 4. Federal statutes relegate to the states primary authority over the sit-
ing and permitting approval for interstate electric transmission lines and oil 
pipelines. See infra Part I (describing state public interest determinations and 
the state and local eminent domain process). By contrast, under section 7 of 
the Natural Gas Act, the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) has 
plenary authority to conduct the review of a proposed interstate gas pipeline 
(including a right of eminent domain). FERC determines whether a proposed 
pipeline meets the “public convenience and necessity” and, although it coordi-
nates with state and federal environmental agencies in pipeline review, it pos-
sesses the ultimate power of eminent domain. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2012).  
 5. See infra Part III.A. 
 6. See infra Part III.C. 
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power from Iowa and other plains states to reach Chicago cus-
tomers, Illinois regulators were presented with objections from 
property owners and Commonwealth Edison, the state’s largest 
electric utility, both of which argued that the project developer 
did not qualify for eminent domain because it was not a “public 
utility” under state law.
7
 
As much as any contemporary issue in American federal-
ism, multi-state energy infrastructure project approval illus-
trates the challenge of regulatory “holdouts.”
8
 As with private 
property holdouts, a government decision whether to coordinate 
with other jurisdictions depends on how the benefits of partici-
pating in a multi-state project are perceived. Citizens in an en-
ergy destination state like California may stand to benefit as 
consumers through decreased electricity costs, more diversified 
sources of power supply, and increased availability of renewa-
ble energy to meet state mandates. However, a government 
regulator in a “pass-through” state, which would neither export 
nor consume power from a proposed transmission line, is espe-
cially likely to face considerable interest group pressure to hold 
out from approving a project. Indeed, if the regulator evaluat-
ing such a project defines the benefits narrowly to focus only on 
in-state firms or citizens (i.e., those who are most likely to be 
voting in that state’s elections), and if in assessing project costs 
the regulator concentrates on anticipated costs to those same 
 
 7. See Julie Wernau, Clean Line’s Wind Power Superhighway Approved 
in Illinois, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 25, 2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.chicagotribune 
.com/business/ct-clean-line-1126-biz-20141125-story.html. The same project is 
facing vocal opposition from landowners in Iowa, which has yet to approve it. 
See Thousands Voice Concern over Rock Island Clean Line, RADIOIOWA (Nov. 
25, 2014), http://www.radioiowa.com/2014/11/25/thousands-voice-concerns-over 
-rock-island-clean-line. 
 8. In this Article we focus on multi-state projects, though some of the 
same tensions can certainly arise with inter-local project approval. A county 
disagreeing with an adjacent municipal government can present a similar dy-
namic. Of course, legal analysis of this problem could differ to the extent that 
interstate commerce is not implicated by entirely intrastate projects; still, 
dormant Commerce Clause principles have also been applied to intra-state 
conflicts between utilities. See, e.g., Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain, 
Municipalization, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1505, 1524–25 (2005) (explaining that dormant Commerce Clause principles 
may keep municipalities from establishing programs which may impact or 
burden interstate commerce). It is also well established that a state cannot 
selectively protect parts of its geographic market, while claiming other parts 
are open to interstate commerce. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. 
Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992) (“[O]ur prior cases teach 
that a State . . . may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by cur-
tailing the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the 
State, rather than through the State itself.”).  
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firms or citizens (as is often perceived), the project probably 
will not gain approval. To name one example, Wisconsin regu-
lators have faced considerable opposition to a proposed electric 
transmission line that is primarily intended to benefit produc-
ers and customers in other states.
9
  
At the same time, as with private property holdouts, a de-
cision not to approve a project can present externalities in the 
form of impacts (both positive and negative) that transcend any 
particular state’s borders. For example, a multi-state infra-
structure project may serve regional or even national interests 
in enhancing grid reliability, promoting energy diversity, or 
addressing climate change. In short, under existing law, regu-
lators considering multi-state infrastructure projects are often 
confronted with a jurisdictional mismatch between those who 
stand to benefit the most from a project, and those who are an-
ticipated to bear its costs. This invites and increases the likeli-
hood of isolationist holdouts that can serve as a barrier to new 
multistate energy projects and initiatives. 
Recent developments in federal constitutional law favor 
deference to state legislative and regulatory determinations as 
a way of promoting federalism, increasing even further the po-
tential for regulatory holdouts to impede coordination. The 
Roberts Court’s application of dormant Commerce Clause re-
view, along with recent federal appellate court cases reviewing 
state energy and climate change initiatives, show some judicial 
reluctance to scrutinize the federalism implications of individ-
ual state decisions.
10
 On top of this, after the Supreme Court’s 
2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London,
11
 courts also rou-
tinely defer to state or local determinations of “public use” (in-
cluding recent state legislation that narrows definitions of pub-
lic use to protect private property) for purposes of assessing 
whether an eminent domain action is valid under the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
The energy infrastructure coordination problem is readily 
solvable by Congress, if it were so inclined. Under the Suprem-
acy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress could establish a 
federal process for siting and eminent domain for interstate 
electric transmission lines and oil pipelines similar to the re-
 
 9. See Mike Ivey, Environmentalists Split over Badger-Coulee Power 
Line, CAP. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), http://host.madison.com/news/local/writers/ 
mike_ivey/environmentalists-split-over-badger-coulee-power-line/article_5483 
79a0-7fcb-11e4-9748-27b73b15eee6.html. 
 10. We discuss this line of cases infra at Part II. 
 11. 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see infra Part III.B. 
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gime it created in the 1930s for interstate natural gas pipe-
lines.
12
 Under the Natural Gas Act, a company seeking to build 
an interstate natural pipeline applies for a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) and if approved, the pipeline company is 
given federal eminent domain authority to build the pipeline 
and state law is preempted.
13
 In 2005, Congress declined to sig-
nificantly expand FERC or other federal agency authority over 
electric transmission line siting, and new congressional action 
along these lines appears highly unlikely in the current politi-
cal climate in the absence of a major blackout or other disas-
ter.
14
 Just as important, there are strong state and local land 
use interests that are vocally opposed to any expansion of fed-




In recognition that congressional action is not forthcoming, 
this Article considers ways in which constitutional dormant 
Commerce Clause principles can help address the state holdout 
problem while still preserving federalism principles, such as 
state sovereignty over land use. We advance an argument for 
revitalizing dormant Commerce Clause review of discriminato-
ry state siting and eminent domain regimes, with the goal of 
better promoting interstate coordination in energy markets. 
Application of dormant Commerce Clause principles and doc-
trine calls into question whether broad judicial deference to 
state siting and eminent domain decisions under the banner of 
federalism makes sense, especially given the interstate coordi-
nation problem. Our analysis also has important implications 
for the considerations that state or local regulators balance as 
they make their decisions under existing regulatory siting and 
eminent domain regimes. Courts routinely accept state regula-
tory procedures so long as they meet Due Process require-
ments, but our approach highlights how, in this context and 
others, the dormant Commerce Clause provides an important 
 
 12. One proposal for federal preemption along such lines is discussed in 
Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1859–69.  
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2012); see also Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & 
Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing broad FERC authori-
ty over siting and eminent domain for interstate natural gas pipelines). 
 14. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1818–19; Rossi, supra note 1, at 
1033–38. 
 15. See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Open Space: Making 
Way for National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (or Not), 26 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 399 (2008) (highlighting land use and environmental concerns 
presented with expansive condemnation of open space for transmission pro-
jects).  
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safeguard against state and local regulatory procedures that 
enable economic protectionism.  
Part I presents the multi-state coordination problem as 
posing a real tension among states in the United States today, 
using interstate electric transmission line projects as an exam-
ple. One solution to regulatory holdouts between jurisdictions is 
for states to bargain among themselves to arrive at a multi-
state solution—either through regional governance or through 
private compensation to dilute interest group dynamics sup-
porting holdouts. Unfortunately, these interstate bargaining 
solutions do not occur routinely today in the context of electric 
transmission line siting. Regional governance solutions have 
proved ineffective at promoting coordination in transmission 
line approval because, short of formal and binding interstate 
compacts, state regulators lack the authority to address the 
holdout problem on their own. While Congress has given ad-
vanced consent to the creation of interstate transmission siting 
compacts,
16
 no such agreements have been adopted to date, 
perhaps because pass-through states do not perceive reciprocal 
benefits and lack strong incentives to make binding commit-
ments. It is certainly possible that project developers could of-
fer payments to private entities and local governments in pass-
through states, perhaps creating sufficient in-state benefits to 
overcome regulatory and public opposition. However, this kind 
of private Coasean bargaining approach (where holdouts are of-
fered some form of payment to cooperate with others) has also 
fallen short of its theoretical ideal. This is in part because of 
remote benefits and uncertainty, given that many multi-state 
projects will not realize benefits for decades into the future and 
there is frequently a manifold potential for private or regulato-
ry holdouts. We describe how the interest group dynamic, cou-
pled with many existing siting and eminent domain laws, ena-
bles, and may even encourage, these kinds of state and local 
government holdouts.  
Part II highlights one promising and under-examined legal 
basis for addressing state holdouts in multi-state infrastructure 
 
 16. The 2005 Amendments to the Federal Power Act established advanced 
consent for interstate compacts between three or more continuous states. 16 
U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2012). The National Center for Interstate Compacts, along 
with the Council of State Governments, has even drafted model language to 
assist states with these efforts. See Transmission Line Siting Compact, COUN-
CIL ST. GOV’TS, http://www.csg.org/NCIC/TransmissionLineSitingCompact 
.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). For a discussion of why states have not used 
this authority to enter into interstate compacts, see Klass, The Electric Grid at 
a Crossroads, supra note 1. 
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projects—constitutional dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 
Despite revived interest of late in federalism, the Roberts Court 
has not been a champion of invalidating discriminatory state 
laws under dormant Commerce Clause principles, particularly 
given consistent vocal criticism of the doctrine by Justices Scal-
ia and Thomas. Highlighting the continued relevance of 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, however, several recent 
federal courts have addressed whether state climate initiatives, 
including renewable energy requirements, are consistent with 
federalism.
17
 Despite some signals to the contrary, including 
dictum from Judge Richard Posner on the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit,
18
 recent appellate court opinions 
show some judicial appetite for upholding state clean energy, 
renewable energy, and carbon emission regulation initiatives.
19
 
Against the backdrop of these decisions, the interstate holdout 
problem presented by energy infrastructure siting highlights 
the need to step back to first principles related to interstate co-
ordination and the political process, in order to evaluate 
whether it is appropriate for federal courts to routinely defer to 
state regulatory decisions. We advance an alternative approach 
to dormant Commerce Clause review that calls for courts to 
evaluate whether state or local regulators have been attentive 
to benefits outside of the particular jurisdiction as a way of im-
proving the political process behind legislative and regulatory 
decisions and better encouraging coordination among states.  
Part III evaluates three common features of state siting 
and eminent domain regimes against these dormant Commerce 
Clause principles and established doctrine. First, we contend 
that dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prevents state regula-
tory agencies from considering only in-state need in granting or 
 
 17. See, e.g., Energy & Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 
2015) (upholding Colorado RPS standard against a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) (upholding California renewable fuel 
standard); North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014) 
(holding that a Minnesota ban on new coal-fired power generated in or import-
ed into Minnesota constitutes extraterritorial legislation that violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause). A recent case, filed in federal court in 2015, chal-
lenges the in-region deliverability requirements of Connecticut’s RPS stand-
ard. See Lawsuit Challenges a Bedrock of Connecticut’s Energy Policy, 
HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 28, 2015, 3:16 PM), http://www.courant.com/ 
business/hc-connecticut-clean-energy-lawsuit-allco-story.html. 
 18. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(noting that a Michigan preference for in-state renewable energy violates 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). 
 19. See supra note 17; infra Part II. 
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denying certificates of need or state siting permits for multi-
state transmission lines. Second, we argue that dormant Com-
merce Clause principles should also prevent state courts from 
considering only benefits to in-state residents in making public 
use determinations for purposes of eminent domain authority 
for multi-state transmission lines. While the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London affords great 
deference to local “public use” determinations,
20
 that case did 
not involve a multi-state project where, we maintain, dormant 
Commerce Clause principles place independent limits on state 
or local decision makers. Third, and most novel, we propose 
that dormant Commerce Clause review should serve to protect 
against a form of structural discrimination that can be created 
by the procedures in many state siting and eminent domain re-
gimes. In particular, some states limit siting applications to on-
ly in-state public utilities, or allow only in-state incumbent 
firms to challenge or intervene in proceedings regarding new 
proposed lines. Even if such procedures are not facially discrim-
inatory, we maintain that litigants should be allowed to pre-
sent evidence of whether these kinds of procedures produce a 
discriminatory effect against out-of-state applicants. Where 
there is a discriminatory effect, states should be required to 
justify them by reference to a non-discriminatory purpose that 
is legitimate and non-illusory—and we argue many of the al-
leged consumer protection benefits used to justify these kinds 
of bans and nonreciprocal procedures do not withstand scruti-
ny. The constitutional concern we identify is hardly an academ-
ic one: for example, FERC Chairman Norman Bay has recently 
questioned whether a state right of first refusal for incumbent 
utilities to propose transmission lines violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause in his concurrences in two FERC decisions 




Part IV evaluates the scope and practical implications of 
our approach to dormant Commerce Clause review. Where an 
infrastructure project requires the action of two or more states, 
we argue that, at a minimum, each state is not only allowed 
 
 20. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 485–89 (2005) (concluding 
that “public use,” as the term is used in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause, need not be interpreted literally to require actual use by the public of 
land taken under the power of eminent domain, but should instead be inter-
preted broadly to include land taken for a “public purpose”).  
 21. See, e.g., In re Southwest Power Pool, 151 FERC ¶ 61,045, 2015 WL 
1736849, at *17–18 (Apr. 16, 2015) (Bay, J., concurring); PJM Interconnection, 
LLC, 150 FERC ¶ 61,038 (Jan. 22, 2015) (Bay, J., concurring).  
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but is in fact required to consider impacts outside of its particu-
lar jurisdiction and make explicit political tradeoffs, especially 
before making a decision to hold out from project approval. This 
raises some important questions about the scope of our pro-
posal. Importantly, while not a toothless approach to dormant 
Commerce Clause review, we do not advance this as a roving 
invitation for courts to engage in cost-benefit assessment. We 
believe that courts can review how states make their regulatory 
decisions without federal judges substituting their own policy 
preferences for politically accountable state decision makers. At 
the same time, such an approach is not appropriate for every 
dormant Commerce Clause challenge. We do not go as far as to 
look with suspicion on virtually any state-specific climate initi-
ative or subsidy, as some would.
22
 We evaluate the implications 
of our approach for other state renewable energy initiatives 
that might (implicitly or explicitly) include coordination fea-
tures, such as the renewable energy initiatives recently upheld 
by the Ninth Circuit in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Co-
rey.
23
 In terms of scope, we see our proposal as having the most 
direct application in instances where coordination is necessary 
to the success of state regulatory goals that are shared by two 
or more states, and especially where existing procedures serve 
as an obstacle to a state making any regulatory decision in the 
first instance.  
Part IV also addresses the practical implications of consti-
tutionally requiring state regulators to engage in a more ro-
bust, regional cost/benefit assessment where multi-state regu-
latory approvals are necessary. Given their potential legal 
vulnerabilities, we have several suggestions for how states can 
reform and clarify their siting and “need” laws and regulations 
to allow for some consideration of benefits beyond a particular 
state’s borders. We also highlight how state “public use” deter-
minations under the Takings Clause (especially under post-
Kelo statutes that limit or ban economic development takings 
in order to expand private property rights protections) are vul-
 
 22. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Carbon Outlasts the Law: States Walk the 
Constitutional Line, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 309, 309–13 (2014) (discuss-
ing briefly several challenges to California’s energy regulations); Harvey 
Reiter, Removing Unconstitutional Barriers to Out-of-State and Foreign Com-
petition from State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Why The Dormant Com-
merce Clause Provides Important Protection for Consumers and Environmen-
talists, 36 ENERGY L.J. 45, 50 (2015) (“The focus of this article is on the 
pernicious impact of [state] renewable resource legislation . . . .”). 
 23. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014). 
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nerable under dormant Commerce Clause principles when they 
fail to contain clear safe harbors for interstate energy infra-
structure project development. In addition, our dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis exposes the potential for facial judicial 
challenges to state procedures—even (and perhaps especially) 
where there is regulatory inaction. Even absent evidence of a 
substantial record supporting actual discrimination against a 
particular out-of-state producer, it is possible that a state siting 
process can violate dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, and we 
make several suggestions for how states can reform their pro-
cedures to address this concern.  
In sum, the dormant Commerce Clause analysis proposed 
in this Article is intended to address the holdout problem with 
energy infrastructure approvals by state and local regulators 
where projects require multi-state coordination, and in particu-
lar state laws that facilitate such holdouts by imposing discrim-
inatory substantive or procedural constraints on the siting ap-
plication process. It is not intended to force a state to adopt 
laws and regulations or to exercise eminent domain powers to 
benefit the citizens of other states. Nor is it intended to dis-
courage a state from regulating any time that it determines 
that regulation imposes broader costs than its citizens, under 
principles of fairness, will or should bear. We limit the scope of 
our proposal to infrastructure or other projects where the ap-
proval of two or more states will be necessary for the project to 
go forward at all—though we think there may be opportunities 
for extension in other contexts where market coordination is 
required to achieve regulatory objectives or where structural 
procedures in state laws promote economic protectionism. Judi-
cial evaluation of state regulatory decisions and frameworks 
does not authorize federal courts to make the substantive 
choice for state regulators, as some skeptics of dormant Com-
merce Clause review fear. Instead, as we hope our study of 
state siting and eminent domain regimes shows, dormant 
Commerce Clause review can help to address deficiencies in the 
state political process that thwart interstate coordination, mak-
ing it more likely that when state or local regulators make a 
substantive choice, they are considering the broader benefits of 
regulatory decisions.  
I.  THE REGULATORY “HOLDOUT” PROBLEM   
Perhaps no issue involving energy and climate regulation 
today depends as much on coordination between state regula-
tors as does the siting of interstate electric transmission lines. 
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Building transmission lines involves multiple regulatory ap-
provals—and this depends primarily on state regulators. This 
Part discusses how, despite significant federal authority over 
most aspects of interstate energy markets, expansion of the 
transmission grid and the oil pipeline network still depends 
heavily on the initiatives of state regulators. We highlight how 
these kinds of infrastructure projects depend on interstate co-
ordination and present state and local regulation as a type of 
holdout problem that threatens its achievement and its bene-
fits, including addressing climate change issues.  
A. THE ENERGY GRID’S SIGNIFICANCE FOR RELIABILITY AND  
CLIMATE POLICY 
The U.S. electric power grid evolved from independent mu-
nicipal power systems to interlinked systems designed to pro-
mote grid reliability, to the regional, interconnected transmis-
sion planning and electric markets that cover much of the 
country today. It powers modern society, providing the critical 
infrastructure for food, transportation, health care, and virtual-
ly every other conceivable need. Today, electricity from nearly 
5,800 power plants travels over 450,000 miles of high voltage 
transmission lines in the United States, connecting with nearly 
6 million miles of lower voltage distribution cables, to provide 
power to homes, businesses, and industrial facilities.
24
 The U.S. 
electric grid constitutes an $876 billion asset managed by over 
3,000 utilities serving nearly 300 million customers.
25
 
A 2013 report by the U.S. House of Representatives high-
lights the importance and vulnerability of the nation’s electric 
grid: 
The vast majority of grid assets are owned and operated by private 
companies and other non-federal institutions. The components of the 
grid are highly interdependent and, as history has shown, a line out-
age or system failure in one area can lead to cascading outages in 
 
 24. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, FAILURE TO ACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 
OF CURRENT INVESTMENT TRENDS IN ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 4, n.3 
(2011), http://ascelibrary.org/doi/pdf/10.1061/9780784478783 [hereinafter 
FAILURE TO ACT]; BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CAPITALIZING ON THE EVOLVING 
POWER SECTOR: POLICIES FOR A MODERN AND RELIABLE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 
16–17 (Feb. 2013). 
 25. See MIT, THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID VII (2011); Mark 
Chediak et al., Crumbling U.S. Grid Gets Jolt Creating Smarter Power in 
Houston, Across County, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2014), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/articles/2014-06-25/crumbling-u-s-grid-gets-jolt-driving-smart 
-houston-power; HARRIS WILLIAMS & CO., TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION 
INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (Summer 2014), http://www.harriswilliams.com/sites/  
default/files/industry_reports/ep_td_white_paper_06_10_14_final.pdf. 
2015] ENERGY AND DORMANT COMMERCE REVIEW 141 
 
other areas. For example, on August 14, 2003, four sagging high-
voltage power lines in northern Ohio brushed into trees and shut off. 
Compounded by a computer system error, this shut-down caused a 
cascade of failures that eventually left 50 million people without pow-
er for two days across the United States and Canada. This event, the 
largest blackout in North American history, cost an estimated $6 bil-
lion and contributed to at least 11 deaths.
26
 
The U.S. high voltage power system is divided into three 
synchronous grids (or “interconnections”)—the Eastern Inter-
connection, the Western Interconnection, and Texas.
27
 While 
electricity movements within each interconnection are relative-
ly easy, power flows between interconnections are very limited. 
Within the interconnections, eight regional entities work with 
the non-governmental North American Electric Reliability Cor-
poration (NERC) to ensure the reliability of the high-voltage 
power grid. Approximately half of the nation’s electric grid is 
further divided among seven Regional Transmission Organiza-
tions (RTOs).
28
 These are voluntary associations of utilities and 
other grid participants, subject to FERC oversight, which man-
age the grid and regional markets for wholesale power.
29
 When 
a utility joins an RTO it delegates the operational control of its 
transmission lines to the RTO.
30
 
Many experts warn that the U.S. transmission grid must 
be modernized and expanded to maintain reliability, anticipate 
increasingly severe weather events brought about by climate 
change, address cyber security concerns, and integrate more 
domestic renewable energy into the grid to achieve federal and 
state climate change goals.
31
 They point out that power outages 
are becoming more frequent in the United States and in order 
to maintain even current levels of grid reliability, the electric 
 
 26. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ELECTRIC GRID VULNERABILITY: 
INDUSTRY RESPONSES REVEAL SECURITY GAPS 4 (2013). 
 27. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 24, at 15; NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 
ET AL., AMERICAN ENERGY FUTURE: TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION 
fig.9.4 (2009). 
 28. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 24, at fig.2; MIT, supra note 
25, at 4. 
 29. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 24, at 21. 
 30. See id. at 16; Regional Transmission Organizations 
(RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC (July 16, 2015), http:// 
www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp; see, e.g., Ill. Commerce 
Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013).   
 31. See, e.g., FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 24, at 46; BIPARTISAN POLICY 
CTR., supra note 24, at 28–33, 79, 101; RICHARD J. CAMPBELL, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., R423923, ELECTRICAL POWER: OVERVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL 
ISSUES 7 (2013) (discussing the aging nature of the transmission grid); MIT, 
supra note 25, at 77; Klass, Takings and Transmission, supra note 1, at 1115–
16; Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1812–14; Rossi, supra note 1, at 1019.  
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industry must make total investments on the scale of $1.5 to $2 
trillion dollars and investments in transmission and distribu-
tion alone of nearly $900 billion.
32
 Likewise, a 2013 White 
House report notes that “[s]evere weather is the number one 
cause of power outages in the United States and costs the econ-
omy billions of dollars a year in lost output and wages, spoiled 
inventory, delayed production, inconvenience and damage to 
grid infrastructure.”
33
 More important, the report points out 
that the “aging nature of the grid,” most of which was con-
structed over a period of more than one hundred years, makes 
the country more susceptible to severe weather-related power 
outages.
34
 The report also warns that the number of outages 
caused by severe weather events is expected to rise as climate 
change increases the frequency of floods, blizzards, and hurri-
canes.
35
 “In 2012, the United States suffered eleven billion-
dollar weather disasters—the second-most for any year on rec-
ord, behind only 2011.”
36
 Indeed, the blackouts caused by Hur-
ricane Sandy on the east coast in 2012 have called into ques-
tion the ability of the U.S. transmission infrastructure to 
withstand more frequent extreme weather events, which may 
be made worse by climate change.
37
  
Although demand for electricity increased 25% between 
1990 and 2009, transmission construction deceased by 30% 
 
 32. See, e.g., THE BRATTLE GRP., TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S POWER IN-
DUSTRY: THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE 2010–2030 iv–xi (Nov. 2008), http:// 
www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/Documents/Transforming_Americas_Power_ 
Industry_Exec_Summary.pdf (summarizing the costs of grid investment); 
Massoud Amin, Toward a More Secure, Strong, and Smart Electric Power 
Grid, IEEE SMART GRID, http://smartgrid.ieee.org/newsletter/january-2011/ 
105-toward-a-more-secure-strong-and-smart-electric-power-grid (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2015) (“In the electricity sector, outages and power quality disturb-
ances cost the economy, on average, more than $80 billion annually and some-
times as much as $188 billion in a single year.”); Chediak et al., supra note 25 
(“Power outages are up 285 percent since 1984 and the U.S. ranks last among 
the top nine western industrialized nations in the average time it takes to get 
the lights back on after power failures. Outages cost businesses as much as 
$150 billion a year in lost continuity. . . .”); Jonathan Fahey, U.S. Power Grid 
Costs Rise but Service Slips, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 5, 2013), http://bigstory 
.ap.org/ article/us-power-grid-costs-rise-service-slips. 
 33. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INCREAS-
ING ELECTRIC GRID RESILIENCE TO WEATHER OUTAGES 4 (Aug. 2013), http:// 
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Grid%20Resiliency%20Report_FINAL 
.pdf. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald & John Schwartz, Rise in Weather Ex-
tremes Threatens Infrastructure, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, at A4. 
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during the same period.
38
 While more recent investments in 
transmission show an improved outlook through 2020, a signif-
icant investment gap remains.
39
 The American Society of Civil 
Engineers estimates that failure to address transmission grid 
needs will result in annual costs to businesses and households 
as a result of blackouts and brownouts of $23 billion in 2020, 
increasing to $44 billion by 2040.
40
 Moreover, some experts 
opine that the EPA’s Clean Power Plan—designed to signifi-
cantly reduce use of coal-fired power and replace it with gas 
turbines and renewable energy—cannot succeed without major 
expansions to the electric transmission grid to connect these 




As for increasing the role of renewable energy in the U.S. 
energy portfolio, it is important to keep in mind that, unlike 
traditional energy sources for electricity (such as coal and nat-
ural gas, which can be transported to power plants near load 
centers by train, truck, ship, or rail), renewable energy in the 
form of wind or solar power can only be transported to load cen-
ters through electric transmission lines. This presents a chal-
lenge because the best on-shore sources of wind and solar ener-
gy are often far from population centers, with wind resources 
centered in the upper Midwest and Plains states and solar re-
sources centered in the desert southwest.
42
 Major new trans-
mission infrastructure built in areas of the country currently 
not well served by long-distance, high-voltage, electric trans-
mission lines is critical to integrating these resources into the 
grid. 
 
 38. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2009 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRA-
STRUCTURE 134 (2009). 
 39. See generally EDISON ELEC. INST., TRANSMISSION PROJECTS AT A 
GLANCE iii (March 2014) (showing increases in transmission investment from 
2011–13 but then a projecting a slight decline in investment from 2013–16). 
 40. FAILURE TO ACT, supra note 24, at 40.  
 41. See Peter Behr, Can EPA’s Climate Plan Work Without a National 
Transmission Plan?, ENERGYWIRE (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/  
stories/1060011373. 
 42. United States—Annual Average Wind Speed at 80 m, NAT’L RENEWA-
BLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/80m_wind/USwind300dpe4 
-11.jpg (last visited Oct. 16, 2015); Photovoltaic Solar Resource of the United 
States, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/eere_ 
pv/national_photovoltaic_2012-01.jpg (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).  
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B. FEDERAL LAWS AND POLICIES FAVORING GRID  
DEVELOPMENT 
The Federal Power Act of 1935 (FPA) provides the “statu-
tory foundation for regulating the business of transmitting and 
selling electricity across state lines.”
43
 The FPA grants FERC 
jurisdiction over “transmission of electric energy in interstate 
commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in in-
terstate commerce.”
44
 States, however, retain authority over re-
tail electricity sales and over the location and construction of 
both intrastate and interstate electric transmission lines.
45
 This 
stands in stark contrast to FERC’s authority in the area of nat-
ural gas, where it has jurisdiction over both the pricing of natu-
ral gas transportation rates as well as the approval of inter-
state natural gas pipelines.
46
  
Until recently, the electric industry was vertically inte-
grated with investor-owned utilities (IOUs) owning generation 
facilities, transmission lines, and distribution lines and states 
granting them exclusive service territories for selling electricity 
to customers. The regulatory structure created in the FPA, 
with some modifications contained in the Public Utility Regula-
tory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), remains mostly in place to-
day.
47
 PURPA expanded FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate 
electricity transmission. In addition, PURPA provided incen-
tives for the growth of renewable energy resources for electric 
power generation, requiring utilities to buy back the surplus 
power from alternative generators at the same rate it would 
cost the utilities to produce the power (known as the utility’s 
 
 43. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18–20 (2002).  
 44. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012). 
 45. The FPA expressly states that FERC  
shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided in this sub-
chapter and subchapter III of this chapter, over facilities used for the 
generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribu-
tion or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate com-
merce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy con-
sumed wholly by the transmitter. 
Id.; see also New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5–8. 
 46. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717–717z (2012); Minisink Residents for 
Envtl. Pres. Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing broad 
FERC authority over transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate 
commerce, including federal siting and eminent domain authority for inter-
state natural gas pipelines); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717f (FERC authority over 
siting and eminent domain for interstate natural gas pipelines). 
 47. See LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 306–12, 435 
(2014) (“[W]ith respect to rates and siting, transmission regulation at the be-
ginning of the 21st century looks very much like it did throughout the 20th.”). 




 This helped to usher in a new era of interstate 
energy markets by allowing non-utility generators to compete 
with investor-owned utilities (IOUs), which otherwise often had 
monopoly power over electricity sales and transmission lines 
within their service territories.
49
 From the perspective of power 
supply, the electric industry has undergone a remarkable 
transformation nationwide. As of 2013, non-utility generators, 
known as “independent power producers,” owned approximate-




At the retail sales level, however, the industry is far less 
competitive. Today, IOUs sell 68% of retail electricity in the 
United States with public municipal utilities selling 15%, rural 
electric cooperatives 13%, and power marketers only about 
4%.
51
 In exchange for this “natural monopoly” over retail sales, 
IOUs are subject to state requirements that electricity rates 
remain reasonable and service is not provided in a discrimina-
tory manner. Many states began to restructure their electricity 
markets in the 1990s to split the vertically integrated utility 
functions of generation, transmission, and distribution and cre-
ate a more market-based system, but the Enron scandal and 
problems in California led many states to revert back to their 
original structures. Today, about half the states are traditional-
ly regulated and the rest are restructured or partially restruc-
tured—creating a fragmented and very parochial approach to 
regulating many aspects of the industry.
52
  
Congress built on the FPA and PURPA in the Energy Poli-
cy Act of 1992, in which it authorized FERC to require utilities 
to grant widespread access to the transmission grid, creating 
more opportunities for competition in power supply.
53
 Congress 
followed this with the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), 
 
 48. See id. at 393–94, 481–83. 
 49. See id.; see also Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Com-
petition and Regulatory Policy, 16 ENERGY L.J. 419 (1995). 
 50. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2013, 
tbl.4.4 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf. 
 51. As of 2014, the percentage of total electricity sold by the various types 
of power providers was: investor-owned utilities (68.5%), publicly owned utili-
ties (14.4%), electric cooperatives (12.8%), federal power agencies (less than 
1%), and power marketers (4.3%). AM. PUBLIC POWER ASS’N, 2014–15 ANNUAL 
DIRECTORY & STATISTICAL REPORT 26 (2014). 
 52. Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. AD-
MIN., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect 
.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).  
 53. See 16 U.S.C. § 824j–824k (2012); Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 
1816. 
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which Congress enacted to diversify fuel sources, promote en-
ergy efficiency, and strengthen the interstate electric transmis-
sion system.
54
 EPAct 2005 amended the FPA and added a num-
ber of policies to create explicit federal “backstop” siting 
authority for interstate electric transmission lines in areas of 
the country subject to significant transmission congestion by 
allowing FERC to override certain state siting decisions.
55
 
However, despite federal endorsement of multiple goals related 
to expanding the transmission grid, the direct impact of these 
federal siting provisions has been extremely limited, in no 
small part because federal courts have interpreted these stat-
utes as granting FERC very little real authority to override 
state transmission siting decisions.
56
 Since EPAct 2005, Con-
gress authorized $4.5 billion in the American Recovery and Re-
investment Act of 2009 to modernize the country’s transmission 
grid.
57
 The Obama Administration has also created an Inter-
agency Rapid Response Team for Transmission to coordinate 
the siting of interstate electric transmission lines that cross 




Although there is still virtually no federal authority over 
electric transmission line siting off federal lands, the laws 
summarized above did grant FERC authority to require utili-
ties, RTOs, and states to engage in planning for interstate 
transmission lines and to increase access to the grid for renew-
able and other non-utility generators. FERC has exercised this 
authority by issuing industry-wide regulations in three major 
sets of orders (all challenged in court and upheld), which have 
consistently emphasized the fundamental importance of trans-
mission infrastructure to the operation of interstate energy 
markets: 
 
 54. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1861; see also DAVIES ET AL., su-
pra note 47, at 463–64 (discussing EPAct 2005). 
 55. See 16 U.S.C. § 824p; Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1818–19 (dis-
cussing FERC backstop siting authority). 
 56. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1817–19; see also Piedmont 
Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 1138 (2010) (interpreting FERC’s backstop siting authority narrowly and 
invalidating FERC rule that would allow it to override state denial of a trans-
mission line siting permit). 
 57. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 47, at 718–19; Recovery Act, U.S. DEP’T 
OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/oe/information-center/recovery-act (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2015). 
 58. Interagency Rapid Response Team for Transmission, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/interagency 
-rapid-response-team-for-transmission (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).  
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Order 888 (1996): Required all transmission line owners 
subject to FERC jurisdiction to allow “open access” to electricity 
transmission by transmitting wholesale power at rates, terms, 
and conditions identical to those applied to their own wholesale 
power supplies.
59
 This order served to usher in unbundling of 
transmission from power supply, which would be priced com-
petitively by market-based rates.
60
  
Order 2000 (1999): Encouraged the creation of RTOs, 
which as discussed above operate the transmission grid in or-
ganized markets to provide access at unbundled rates estab-
lished through a single grid-wide tariff.
61
 In follow-up regula-
tions implementing this, FERC required transmission line 
operators to include large generator interconnection procedures 
and agreements in their transmission tariffs,
62
 and required 




Order 1000 (2011): Directed RTOs, utilities, and states to 
cooperate and consider the benefits of interstate electric trans-
mission lines. It required each public utility transmission pro-
vider to (1) participate in a regional transmission planning pro-
cess; (2) establish procedures to identify transmission needs 
based on public policy requirements (including state renewable 
energy goals) in state or federal laws and regulations and eval-
uate proposed solutions; and (3) coordinate with public utility 
transmission providers in neighboring transmission-planning 
regions to determine solutions to mutual transmission needs. 
One purpose of the order was to give more priority to lines that 
will serve renewable energy goals and to make those lines more 
affordable by sharing the cost of those lines over a wider area.
64
 
Thus, there is an established federal policy supporting in-
terstate power markets, on which Congress, FERC, and courts 
have all agreed: Congress has given FERC authority to set fed-
 
 59. Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs., 75 FERC ¶ 31,036, 18 C.F.R. pts. 
35 & 385 (1996), aff’d, New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
 60. See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 773–74 (2008). 
 61. Order No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs., 89 FERC ¶ 61,285, 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35 (1999), appeals dismissed sub nom. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 272 
F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 62. Order No. 2003, FERC Stats. & Regs., 104 FERC ¶ 61,103, 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35 (2003). 
 63. Order No. 890-A, FERC Stats. & Regs., 121 FERC ¶ 61,297, 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 37 (2007). 
 64. Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs., 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35 (2011), aff’d, S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
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eral policies on interstate electric transmission line planning 
and approval to increase reliability and to increase the use of 
renewable energy in the electricity grid. For nearly three dec-
ades FERC has consistently used the authority granted to it by 
Congress and the courts to expand interstate energy markets 
over electricity—in a manner parallel to FERC’s development 
and expansion of interstate markets over natural gas.
65
 FERC’s 
major market restructuring initiatives addressing competitive 
wholesale power supply and transmission access and planning 
have also consistently met success before the judiciary.  
Despite these actions by Congress and FERC, the simple 
reality is that, as we discuss below, under existing law, trans-
mission line siting and permitting decisions remain state pre-
rogatives. For example, one of the prominent interstate electric 
transmission line projects put on the “fast-track” under the 
Obama Administration’s Rapid Response Team for Transmis-
sion described above is the SunZia Southwest Transmission 
Project, which has been in the review and planning process 
since 2008.
66
 This project consists of two bi-directional 500-kV 
lines in Arizona and New Mexico designed to spur development 
of renewable energy in those states and is hoped to be in ser-
vice by 2018.
67
 In January 2015, the U.S. Department of Interi-
or announced with great fanfare the approval of the lines 
across federal lands, which required significant negotiations 
between numerous federal agencies including the Department 
of Defense, which operates a missile site on land along the pro-
posed line.
68
 But almost immediately after announcement of the 
federal approval, the New Mexico Land Commissioner an-
nounced a 60-day “hold” on the project to address issues associ-
ated with the lines’ impact on state public lands and expressed 





 65. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas 
Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L. J. 1 (1988) (discussing gov-
ernment regulation of the natural gas industry).  
 66. See Rachel Giron, Struggles on the Path to Renewable Energy: Lessons 
from SunZia, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 81 (2014) (examining the SunZia project 
and offering solutions to issues that may arise during the transmission siting 
process); SUNZIA, http://www.sunzia.net (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
 67. See SUNZIA, supra note 66.  
 68. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Interior Department Greenlights 
Transmission Line to Modernize Grid, Unlock Renewable Energy Sources in 
Southwest (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/interior 
-department-greenlights-transmission-line-to-modernize-grid-unlock  
-renewable-energy-sources-in-southwest.cfm.  
 69. Associated Press, NM Land Commissioner Puts the Brakes on SunZia, 
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C. STATE REGULATORY PRIMACY OVER SITING AND EMINENT  
DOMAIN 
As noted above, although FERC has jurisdiction over 
wholesale, interstate power sales and may act to prevent dis-
crimination in access to transmission lines, it is the states that 
exercise primary authority over the permitting and siting of 
transmission lines. Thus, an interstate line must receive ap-
proval from all the states in its path following each state’s per-
mitting processes and standards. Most states grant their public 
utility commissions (PUCs) authority to review and approve 
transmission lines based on a determination of whether there is 
a “need” for the line, alternatives to the line, and the potential 
environmental impacts of the line. If successful, the line re-
ceives a certificate of need, sometimes also called a “certificate 
of public convenience and necessity.” Once the transmission op-
erator receives its certificate, in most states that authorizes it 
to exercise the power of eminent domain to build the line if vol-
untary negotiations for easements with landowners fail. In a 
few states, a transmission operator may exercise eminent do-
main even without obtaining a certificate of need.
70
  
States differ as to whether only “public utilities,” which sell 
power directly to customers within the jurisdiction, can exercise 
eminent domain authority to build transmission lines or 
whether that authority also extends to “independent transmis-
sion companies” and “merchant transmission companies.” The-
se are companies that do not own generation assets or sell re-
tail electricity, as do public utilities, but instead are simply in 
business to build transmission lines and to operate the lines. As 
we discuss below,
71
 some states specify by statute that only 
public utilities can exercise eminent domain to build transmis-
sion lines and thus merchant transmission lines do not have 
that power. Other states specify by statute that transmission 
lines are a per se “public use” for Takings Clause purposes and 
do not specifically limit eminent domain authority to public 
utilities. Other states’ statutes, however, are unclear as to what 
types of entities qualify to exercise the power of eminent do-
 
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.abqjournal.com/533310/news/ 
nm-land-commissioner-puts-the-brakes-on-sunzia.html.  
 70. Details and examples are discussed in Brown & Rossi, supra note 1, at 
714–27. See also infra Part III.A (discussing factors balanced in a certificate of 
need determination). 
 71. See infra Part III.C (discussing limits on siting applicant due to public 
utility status).  
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main for electric transmission lines.
72
  
The virtually exclusive state authority over electric trans-
mission line siting and eminent domain authority stands in 
contrast to the regulatory regime for interstate natural gas 
pipelines.
73
 Under the Natural Gas Act, FERC has exclusive ju-
risdiction to grant siting certificates for interstate natural gas 
pipelines, and the certificate authorizes the natural gas pipe-
line company to exercise eminent domain authority in all the 
states through which the proposed pipeline will pass.
74
 Alt-
hough the drastically different permitting authorities for inter-
state electric transmission lines and interstate natural gas 
pipelines may seem surprising, federal regulation of each in-
dustry arose in very different eras with very different con-
cerns.
75
 The interstate natural gas industry was relatively new 
in the 1930s and there were significant concerns about discrim-
ination, overcharging customers, and unfair negotiations with 
producers and pipelines, many of which sold gas on a national 
scale.
76
 The same concerns regarding the electricity industry 
were not as prevalent at that time, with states regulating most 
utilities and grids and most utilities producing and selling 
power in a much more localized fashion than they do today.
77
 
D. THE PUBLIC GOVERNANCE “HOLDOUT” PROBLEM WITH THE  
TRANSMISSION GRID 
Transmission lines remain extremely unpopular. Although 
everyone wants the grid to work and the lights to go on, few 
people want high-voltage transmission lines near their homes 
and businesses or, worse, on their properties. Indeed, even 
though environmental nonprofit groups generally favor renew-
able energy, they have historically been the primary plaintiffs 
in lawsuits challenging transmission lines on environmental 
protection and aesthetic grounds.
78
 Although this has shifted 
somewhat in recent years as many environmental groups rec-
 
 72. See infra Part III.B (discussing eminent domain issue). 
 73. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
 74. See, e.g., Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads, supra note 1 (dis-
cussing federal process for obtaining approval and eminent domain authority 
for interstate natural gas pipelines).  
 75. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1862–64. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1897–99. 
 78. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Energy Transmission Across Wild and 
Scenic Rivers: Balancing Increased Access to Nontraditional Power Sources 
with Environmental Protection Policies, 34 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 
6 (2013); McLaughlin, supra note 15, at 404–05. 
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ognize that interstate electric transmission lines are critical to 
integrating large-scale wind and solar energy into the grid, 
public opposition to transmission lines remains.
79
 Moreover, in 
many cases where a new transmission line is proposed to bring 
power across state lines, in-state residents often see themselves 
as incurring only the costs of the line and none of the benefits 
of the line. It is not surprising, then, that when a state PUC or 
a state court is considering the “need” for the line or whether 
the line is a “public use,” it will weigh the interests of its own 
citizens more heavily than those in other states who are not 
natural constituents of the state agency or court. Indeed, under 
most state statutes authorizing PUCs to approve transmission 
lines based on “need,” there are no specific provisions authoriz-
ing state PUCs to consider regional need as opposed to in-state 
need.
80
 The same is true for a state court determination of “pub-




From a public governance perspective, this can be under-
stood as a regulatory “holdout” problem. Building a new trans-
mission line requires the coordination of two or more states. 
Each state may incur costs in issuing a siting permit or grant-
ing eminent domain power. However, each state may not value 
the benefits of siting the transmission line in the same manner. 
The benefits of a new line are especially likely to be questioned 
in a “pass-through” state, which will not directly benefit from 
either the export of power or from the consumption of out-of-
state sources of electricity. Regulators in such states are likely 
to face political pressure from both property owners and con-
sumer groups to oppose such lines. In addition, regulators may 
face strategic pressure from incumbent firms who own trans-
mission lines—often public utilities who have a monopoly over 
incumbent customers within the jurisdiction—and who stand to 
lose a share of the current market power to competitors. In this 
context, incentives surrounding the private interest group dy-
namic can also present the possibility for a state or local gov-
ernment actor to hold out.  
In theory, any project developer could buy out private 
holdouts, as is well chronicled in the law and economic litera-
 
 79. See, e.g., John Dillon, Energy Bill Splits Environmentalists over Role 
of Act 250, VT. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 19, 2013, 7:34 AM) http://www.vpr.net/ 
news_detail/97837/energy-bill-splits-environmentalists-over-role-act/ (discuss-
ing split in environmental community over renewable energy development); 
Ivey, supra note 9.  
 80. See infra Part III. 
 81. Id. 
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ture surrounding property law. Of course, this can be incredibly 
costly where a transmission line crosses a large number of 
property owners’ parcels—and especially when these property 
owners are not concentrated in the same geographic area but 
instead span hundreds of miles and multiple jurisdictions. In 
addition, non-land use interest groups complicate the public 
governance holdout aspect of siting transmission lines. Con-
sumer interests often oppose lines, out of fears that they will 
bear new costs in the future. So too do competitors, such as the 
incumbent utility firm that opposes a line or would prefer to 
own and control it locally. This makes for a particularly diffi-
cult type of interest group maneuvering for any developer who 
wishes to present a transmission line as a win-win proposition 
for all affected stakeholders. Looking to the pragmatics of mod-
ern transmission line projects, some transmission line develop-
ers certainly have attempted forward-looking initiatives to dis-
courage such holdouts, such as investing in community 
outreach and public projects that may be attractive to a state 
and its citizens, such as parks and bike paths, as well as more 
attractive payment structures.
82
 However, most transmission 
line developers rely on revenue streams over time to finance 
their projects and, given that these projects already face high 
capital costs and risks, they may lack the up-front capital nec-
essary to go beyond traditional easement-based payments. This 
is a context where eminent domain approvals remain essential 
for a project to succeed, and public governance holdouts can 
serve as an obstacle to a project getting off the ground in the 
first place.  
By limiting the substantive considerations for a regulatory 
decision, or by limiting participation in the process, the regula-
tory frameworks of state siting and eminent domain law may 
enable these kinds of state holdouts. For instance, in Mississip-
pi Power and Light Co. v. Conerly, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court held in 1984 that there was no “public necessity” and no 
“public use” for a line proposed by a Mississippi power company 
 
 82. See Dan Haugen, If Landowners Get Annual Payments for Wind Tur-
bines, Why Not Transmission Lines, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2013/10/23/if-landowners-get-annual 
-payments-for-wind-turbines-why-not-transmission-lines; Lu Nelson, From the 
Ground up: Addressing Key Community Concerns in Clean Energy Transmis-
sion, CTR. FOR RURAL AFF. (2013), http://files.cfra.org/pdf/Energy-From-the 
-Ground-Up.pdf; Rosalie Winn, Landowner Compensation in Transmission Sit-
ing for Renewable Energy, CTR. FOR RURAL AFF. (May 2014), http://www.cfra 
.org/sites/www.cfra.org/files/publications/landowner-compensation-052014_0 
.pdf. 
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to transmit power from the state to a Louisiana power company 
for distribution in Louisiana.
83
 The Mississippi PUC had grant-
ed a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the line, 
and when the company sought to take property in the line’s 
path by eminent domain, the landowners argued there was no 
public necessity or public use for the line.
84
 In siding with the 
landowners, the state supreme court quoted the lower court’s 
findings and agreed that “[n]ot one Mississippi customer is to 
be served by the transmission line,” “that the terms ‘public ne-
cessity’ and ‘public use’ . . . contemplate use by the citizens of 
this state,” and that the power company’s contention that it 
would be able to run power back to citizens of Mississippi in the 
future if warranted was speculative.
85
 Similarly, in Clark v. 
Gulf Power Co., the Florida District Court of Appeal held in 
1967 that a state’s power of eminent domain exists “only within 
its territorial limits for the use and benefit of the people within 
the state.”
86
 Thus, a “one way transmission line” from Florida to 
Georgia from which Florida citizens “will not derive one iota of 
benefit” was outside the state’s eminent domain authority.
87
 
Similarly, as we discuss below, many states limit procedural 
rights in eminent domain and siting proceedings, including who 
can apply and who can intervene to challenge a decision.
88
  
Although the regulatory holdout problem we describe is, by 
its very nature, beyond the power of any individual state to 
solve on its own, not every state’s regulatory process succumbs 
to it. Some states have adopted broader definitions of need and 
public use that encompass out-of-state benefits, including im-
provements to reliability. In Oxendine v. PSI, the Indiana 
Court of Appeals held in 1980 that a power company could ex-
ercise eminent domain authority to build a line to increase the 
reliability of the network, even though it would not provide 
electricity to customers in its service territory.
89
 In rejecting the 
challenge by landowners to the eminent domain action, the 
court held that the grant of eminent domain authority was to 
furnish electricity to “the ‘public’ not to Indiana residents 
alone.”
90
 States facing incentives to export power for economic 
 
 83. 460 So. 2d 107, 113 (Miss. 1984). 
 84. Id. at 108–13. 
 85. Id. at 113. 
 86. Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See infra Part III.C. 
 89. Oxendine v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind. 423 N.E.2d 612, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1980). 
 90. Id. at 617. 
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development purposes also may be likely to view public purpos-
es in an expansive manner.
91
 For example, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court held in 1976, in Square Butte Electric Coopera-
tive v. Hilken, that an electric cooperative could exercise emi-
nent domain to build a line to provide electricity to its members 
in Minnesota.
92
 In finding a public use, the court held that citi-
zens of North Dakota would benefit from the additional reliabil-
ity the line would provide to the electric grid as a whole.
93
 The 
concurring opinion by Justice Pederson relied on the broad 
statutory grant of eminent domain authority to build transmis-
sion lines which he stated was a reflection of the state’s desire 
to “market our natural resources and excess energy” and to 
“bolster[] the state economy.”
94
 
II.  FEDERALISM, POLITICAL PROCESS, AND 
INTERSTATE COORDINATION   
While most states have not addressed the issue of how 
broadly to interpret their statutes governing “need” and “public 
use” in the context of interstate electric transmission lines, the 
issue is certain to arise much more frequently as new lines are 
proposed to be built across the country. Moreover, the potential 
conflict between localized state interests and federal or regional 
interests in promoting interstate lines will become increasingly 
acute because of the regionalization of the grid, the new in-
vestments utilities and merchant companies are making in in-
terstate transmission, and the new federal policies in place to 
promote interstate energy markets and to plan interstate lines 
for reliability and renewable energy purposes.  
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine derives from the U.S. 
Constitution’s grant of power to Congress “[t]o regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several states.”
95
 Modern dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence “is driven by concern about ‘eco-
nomic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to 
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state 
competitors.’”
96
 Contemporary judicial skeptics, most promi-
nently Justices Scalia and Thomas, refer to the doctrine as the 
“negative” Commerce Clause, indicating its lack of any explicit 
 
 91. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 1, for further discussion. 
 92. 244 N.W.2d 519, 530 (N.D. 1976). 
 93. Id. at 526–27. 
 94. Id. at 532 (Pederson, J., concurring). 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 96. Dep’t. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (quot-
ing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988)). 
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textual basis in the Constitution.
97
 At the extreme, Justice 
Thomas has indicated he would scrap the doctrine altogether;
98
 
while skeptical about the doctrine, Justice Scalia seems more 
inclined to want to follow the longstanding precedent that sup-
ports it but limit its scope.
99
 Even beyond its most extreme crit-
ics, from time to time the Supreme Court has questioned the 
judiciary’s institutional capacity to use dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine to scrutinize state regulations in any consistent 
or principled way, especially since courts lack the expertise or 
political accountability of legislators or regulators in assessing 
the costs and benefits of state initiatives—a concern the Rob-




Despite criticism from some corners, dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine limits on state protectionism have a longstand-
ing basis in constitutional law and continue to be widely under-
stood as essential to American understandings of federalism.
101
 
As Justice Cardozo famously remarked in striking down a New 
York law that set minimum prices all milk dealers were re-
quired to pay New York milk producers, the Commerce Clause 
prohibits a state law that burdens interstate commerce “when 
 
 97. This skeptical view has been criticized for its misplaced reading of 
constitutional text, history, and federalism. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, 
Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384 (2003) (questioning 
whether using other textual provisions of the Constitution to limit state regu-
lations impairing trade can advance the same federalism values as dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine); Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course 
Unbroken: The Constitutional Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 
VA. L. REV. 1877 (2011) (questioning the accuracy of those who claim no textu-
al or historical support for dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). 
 98. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 
U.S. 564, 610–20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 99. “I will, on stare decisis grounds, enforce a self-executing ‘negative’ 
Commerce Clause in two situations: (1) against a state law that facially dis-
criminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law that is in-
distinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this 
Court.” West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, 
J., concurring).  
 100. See infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 101. As Oliver Wendell Holmes once stated: 
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our 
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would 
be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of 
the several States. For one in my place sees how often a local policy 
prevails with those who are not trained to national views and how of-
ten action is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was 
meant to end. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295–96 (1920). 
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the avowed purpose of the [law], as well as its necessary ten-
dency, is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competi-
tion between the states.”
102
 This general principle was also in-
voked to strike down a New York regulatory scheme that had 
been used to deny a license to an out-of-state milk processing 
facility. Since the licensing provision had been enacted “solely 
[for] protection of local economic interests, such as supply for 




It is less commonly understood that dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine played an important role in the history of con-
temporary energy law. Modern federal energy statutes, such as 
the FPA, were adopted in large part to address some of the con-
stitutional limits faced by states in regulating energy markets. 
Prior to 1935, states possessed the primary authority over en-
ergy sales. Courts, however, recognized limits on the ability of 
any state to regulate extra-jurisdictional transactions. Most 
prominently, in the 1920s, the Supreme Court invalidated 
Rhode Island’s regulation of the rates charged by a plant in the 
state selling electricity to a Massachusetts company to resell to 
a utility serving Massachusetts customers, reasoning that it 
imposed a “direct burden upon interstate commerce.”
104
 These 
limits on state authority to regulate extra-jurisdictional energy 
transactions came to be known as the “Attleboro Gap,” a juris-
dictional problem Congress addressed when it adopted federal 
energy statutes in the 1930s. As the Supreme Court has noted, 
“When it enacted the FPA in 1935, Congress authorized federal 
regulation of electricity in areas beyond the reach of state pow-
er, such as the gap identified in Attleboro, but it also extended 




Thus, notwithstanding some contemporary critics, dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine is steeped in the American constitu-
tional tradition and remains of particular significance to energy 
markets. It is alive and well as a constitutional basis for con-
straining state and local protectionism, as reflected in the Rob-
erts Court’s consistent refusal to reject the doctrine despite crit-
ics on the Court, as well as advocates who regularly plea for the 
 
 102. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
 103. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949). 
 104. Public Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 
83, 89 (1927).  
 105. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002). 
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doctrine to be abandoned.
106
 This Part discusses why dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine is especially well suited to address 
problems in energy transportation infrastructure, insofar as it 
focuses on promoting a norm of coordination between states 
that is essential to both federalism and energy markets. Sec-
tion A introduces modern dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
and highlights some of the key debates that inform the applica-
tion of this jurisprudence to the regulation of energy, focusing 
in particular on market entry barriers and discriminatory regu-
lations and fees. Section B summarizes the most recent new set 
of dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state energy initia-
tives involving state renewable energy and climate initiatives. 
Although these cases have for the most part upheld the prima-
ry features of these state initiatives, there remains some uncer-
tainty about how much deference lower courts will afford in 
this context. In recognition that courts need to be consistent not 
only in doctrine but in the principles that are informing the ap-
plication of that doctrine, Section C calls for a revitalization of 
dormant Commerce Clause review to focus on interstate coor-
dination as an essential federalism value. The holdout problem 
faced in energy transportation infrastructure can be overcome 
if jurisdictions broaden their assessment of the benefits of pro-
jects to include out-of-state interests. We propose a way for 
courts to do this that is consistent with existing doctrine and 
mindful of concerns regarding potential judicial overreach. 
A. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE AND ITS  
APPLICATION TO ENERGY MARKETS 
Modern dormant Commerce Clause doctrine applies three 
distinct analytical approaches in assessing whether subnation-
al regulations discriminate against or impermissibly burden in-
terstate commerce. Courts review laws or regulations that dis-
criminate on their face (often called “per se” discrimination) or 
discriminate in purpose or effect under a form of strict scrutiny. 
 
 106. See, e.g., infra note 110. Underscoring the continued vitality of the 
doctrine, the Supreme Court has recently held that Maryland’s income tax for 
nonresidents (based on income earned based on work or sources within the 
state) is unconstitutional on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. The Court 
reasoned that the tax is discriminatory because it fails the “internal consisten-
cy” test used to isolate the effects of tax schemes, which “looks to the structure 
of the tax at issue to see whether its identical application by every State in the 
Union would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with 
commerce intrastate.” Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 
1787, 1802–04 (2015) (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 
U.S. 175, 185 (1995)). 
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When a law discriminates in its purpose or has a significant 
discriminatory effect, reviewing courts generally require a state 
to demonstrate that it enacted the law for a legitimate, non-
protectionist purpose and that there are no less discriminatory 
means that would advance this purpose.
107
  
Nondiscriminatory laws that impose only an incidental ef-
fect on interstate commerce are subject to a balancing test 
(known as “Pike balancing”), which would uphold the law un-
less a challenger can prove that the “burden imposed on [inter-
state] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.”
108
 By not requiring a least restrictive alterna-
tive, by its very nature this is a much more deferential stand-
ard of review—perhaps more akin to rational basis review. 
Still, over the years Pike balancing has been used by the Court 
to reject multiple initiatives, including an Iowa law that limited 
the length of double semi-trailers on interstate highways based 
on what the Court cited as an “illusory” claim to safety benefits 
by the state.
109
 Nevertheless, it has been more than 25 years 
since the Supreme Court has invalidated a state law based on 
Pike balancing. The Roberts Court has not rejected this strand 
of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, but its opinions show 
some wariness regarding the judiciary’s institutional capacity 
to engage in this kind of judicial review—primarily out of fear 
that courts will overstep in weighing the costs and benefits of 
state regulation.
110
 Lower courts, however, continue to see the 
 
 107. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1984) 
(invalidating a law that exempted local production of liquor and wine from a 
20% excise tax on the grounds that this had no purpose other than to insulate 
local producers from competition); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 
624–28 (1978) (applying “a virtually per se rule of invalidity” to explicit ban on 
in-state disposal of out-of-state garbage); Hunt v. Wash. Apple Advert. 
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977) (finding that a facially neutral law ap-
plying to apple distribution discriminated in effect against out-of-state apple 
suppliers and was invalid); see also Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839, 842 
(11th Cir. 2008) (finding unconstitutional a local ordinance that would have 
prohibited chain retail establishments, such as a Starbucks coffee shop). 
 108. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  
 109. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); see also 
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (invalidating similar 
Wisconsin law). 
 110. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008) 
(refusing to apply Pike balancing and expressing skepticism about the use of 
the judicial branch’s ability to balance the general costs and benefits of regula-
tion); United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 347 (2007) (noting that a state law that favors a traditional govern-
ment function but does not favor local private entities is not discriminatory, 
and observing that finding otherwise would “reclaim that ground for judicial 
supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause”). 
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Pike balancing approach as “deferential but not toothless,”
111
 
questioning or invalidating state or local laws when the alleged 
local benefits are a pretext for discrimination or are trivial.
112
  
A third, and much more controversial, prong of dormant 
Commerce Clause review prohibits “exterritorial regulation” by 
prohibiting a state from attempting to control activities that oc-
cur entirely outside of its jurisdiction.
113
 Such laws are also sub-
ject to strict scrutiny but unlike laws that discriminate against 
interstate commerce, if a law is deemed to constitute extraterri-
torial regulation, the state has no opportunity to attempt to 




Although the Roberts Court has consistently favored fram-
 
 111. See Colon Health Ctrs. of Am. v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 545 (4th Cir. 
2013) (citing Dep’t of Revenue of Ky., 533 U.S. at 339 (2008)). 
 112. Id. at 545–46 (holding that a district court erred in granting a motion 
to dismiss challenging Virginia’s certificate of need law based on Pike balanc-
ing); Walgreen Co. v. Rullan, 405 F.3d 50, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2005) (invalidating a 
facially neutral Puerto Rico law that required new pharmacies to obtain a cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity but exempted existing local pharmacies 
and allowed them to object to proposed new pharmacy applications); Yamaha 
Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401 F.3d 560, 569–74 (4th Cir. 
2005) (invalidating a Virginia law that limited the ability of motorcycle manu-
facturers to open new dealerships in the state); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cal. 
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 346 F.3d 851, 870–72 (9th Cir. 2003) (invalidating a Cali-
fornia regulation that implemented performance standards for railroad com-
panies); McNeilus Truck & Mfg., Inc. v. Ohio, 226 F.3d 429, 444 (6th Cir. 
2000) (finding that an Ohio motor vehicle licensing dealer statute, which failed 
strict scrutiny, also would fail Pike balancing, because the burden it imposes is 
clearly excessive in relation to any local benefits); Medigen of Ky., Inc. v. Pub. 
Serv. Co. of W. Va., 985 F.2d 164, 166–67 (4th Cir. 1992) (invalidating a West 
Virginia medical waste transport certification requirement under Pike balanc-
ing, noting that restricting market entry does not advance consumer protec-
tion or reasonable service goals, and that a state cannot deny an applicant cer-
tification solely on the ground that “the area it seeks to serve already has 
reasonably efficient and adequate service”). 
 113. See, e.g., Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660, 668–69 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (invalidating state’s application of its consumer protection code to 
an out-of-state lender). The extraterritorial doctrine finds root in Baldwin v. 
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). As one court notes, however, it is not 
clear that this is “really a distinct line of dormant commerce clause jurispru-
dence at all.” Instead, “one might see Baldwin and its progeny as no more 
than instantiations of the Philadelphia anti-discrimination rule.” Energy & 
Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015). For criticism 
of the extraterritorial doctrine, see Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality 
and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 
979 (2013); see also Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, 
Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLI-
MATE & ENERGY L. 127 (2013–14). 
 114. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 381–82 (6th Cir. 
2013) (Rice, J. concurring). 
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ing its own approach to dormant Commerce Clause review to 
focus on facially discriminatory laws or those that discriminate 
significantly in purpose or effect, rather than evaluating the 
other two strands of the dormant Commerce Clause, all three 
tests remain valid approaches and are used routinely in as-
sessing the constitutionality of state regulation of energy mar-
kets. These doctrines have particularly important implications 
for state regulations that ban or limit access to markets, such 
as certificates of need, as well as to differential regulations and 
fees that states routinely impose on energy firms.  
1. Market Bans 
There is little doubt that there are clear instances in ener-
gy markets where states can go too far in treating out-of-state 
suppliers differently in an interstate market. Outright bans on 
the export or import of energy from particular sources are the 
most obviously suspect. For example, in New England Power 
Co. v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court struck down a New 
Hampshire regulation that prohibited the export of hydroelec-
tric power produced in the state, noting the obviously discrimi-
natory effect this has on interstate commerce.
115
 Such bans 
may, in limited circumstances, be justified where a state has no 
other options to achieve an important environmental objective. 
The Court upheld a Maine statute that prohibited imports of 
live baitfish because of the parasite threat to Maine fisheries in 
Maine v. Taylor.
116
 Maine, the Court observed, is under no obli-
gation under the Commerce Clause “to sit idly by and wait un-
til potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred 
or until the scientific community agrees on what disease organ-
isms are and are not dangerous before it acts to avoid such con-
sequences.”
117
 As the Court reasoned, “[t]his is not a case of ar-
bitrary discrimination against interstate commerce; the record 
suggests that Maine has legitimate reasons, ‘apart from their 
origin, to treat [out-of-state baitfish] differently.’”
118
  
Short of outright bans, the Supreme Court has invalidated 
state certificate of need requirements (requiring preapproval by 
regulators to participate in the market) where these lack a le-
gitimate, non-protectionist rationale and effectuate an obstacle 
 
 115. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 445 U.S. 331 (1982). 
 116. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
 117. Id. at 148 (quoting U.S. v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me. 
1984)).  
 118. Id. at 151–52 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 
627 (1978)).  
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to interstate commerce by denying access to the market. Buck 
v. Kuykendall rejected a Washington statute that prohibited 
common carriers from using public highways in the state with-
out a certificate of need.
119
 There Justice Brandeis observed: 
[The statute’s] primary purpose is not regulation with a view to safety 
or to conservation of the highways, but the prohibition of competition. 
It determines not the manner of use, but the persons by whom the 
highways may be used. It prohibits such use to some persons while 




With a nod to federal preemption the Court observed that this 
“also defeats the purpose of Congress expressed in the legisla-
tion giving federal aid for the construction of interstate high-
ways”
121
—though the same day the Court also held unconstitu-




Even a facially neutral licensing scheme can have a similar 
discriminatory effect to a ban and raise dormant Commerce 
Clause concerns under this line of cases. Such a program can 
effectuate significant discrimination against interstate com-
merce even if out-of-state firms are allowed to apply. To take 
one example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
jected a motor vehicle dealer-licensing program that gave es-
tablished local interests the ability to block licensing of out-of-
state dealers by refusing to contract with them for warranty 
services.
123
 This illustrates how even if a law is facially neutral, 
where there is a discriminatory effect a state needs to justify its 
regulatory program and to establish that there is no less re-





 119. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925).  
 120. Id. at 315–16. 
 121. Id. at 316. 
 122. George W. Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 317, 324–25 (1925) 
(holding a similar Maryland statute unconstitutional, even though the high-
ways at issue were not constructed or improved with any federal aid, on the 
grounds that it is clear that “the purpose of Congress is that the state high-
ways shall be open to interstate commerce”). A summary of multiple cases 
reaching a similar result in the transportation context appears in Medigen of 
Kentucky, Inc. v. Public Service Comm’n of West Virginia, 787 F. Supp. 590, 
597 (S.D.W.V. 1991). 
 123. McNeilus Truck & Mfg. Inc., v. Ohio, 226 F.3d 429, 444 (6th Cir. 
2000). 
 124. As the Sixth Circuit noted, such program also may fail Pike balancing. 
Id. at 444. Indeed, under Pike, licensing programs that restrict market entry 
and favor incumbents have been struck down by federal appellate courts, de-
spite state claims to some benefits to consumers. See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. 
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2. Discriminatory Regulations and Fees 
In addition to state regulatory bans or licensing programs 
that serve as a barrier to entry from out-of-state firms operat-
ing in that state’s market in the first instance, programs that 
impose differential regulations or fees on out-of-state sources of 
energy also have been challenged under dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine. In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court 
struck down an Oklahoma law requiring coal-fired power 
plants located in the state to burn at least ten percent Oklaho-
ma-mined coal.
125
 The Court determined that the statute dis-
criminated against interstate commerce “on its face” because it 
“expressly reserve[d] a segment of the Oklahoma coal market 




Not every regulation or fee is facially discriminatory, and 
many will require a more nuanced analysis—as the Supreme 
Court has recognized. In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown, the Court invalidated a municipally imposed mo-
nopoly over non-recyclable solid waste collected for processing 
and transfer.
127
 To guarantee a minimum stream of revenues 
for the project, the Town of Clarkstown, New York adopted a 
flow control ordinance, allowing the private operator of a trans-
fer station to collect a fee of $81 per ton, which was higher than 
the disposal cost of solid waste in the private market. C & A 
Carbone, Inc. processed solid waste and operated a recycling 
center, as it was permitted to do under the Clarkstown flow 
control ordinance. The flow control ordinance required compa-
nies like Carbone to bring non-recyclable waste to the locally 
franchised transfer station and to pay a fee, while prohibiting 
them from shipping the waste themselves. “[A] financing 
measure,” the flow control ordinance ensured that “the town-
sponsored facility will be profitable, so that the local contractor 
can build it and Clarkstown can buy it back at nominal cost in 
 
Rullan, 405 F.3d 50, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2005) (invalidating a facially neutral 
Puerto Rico law requiring new pharmacies to obtain a certificate of conven-
ience and necessity, but exempting existing local pharmacies and allowing 
them to object to proposed new pharmacy applications); Medigen of Ky., Inc., 
985 F.2d at 167 (invalidating a West Virginia medical waste transport certifi-
cation requirement under Pike balancing, noting that restricting market entry 
does not advance consumer protection or reasonable service goals and that a 
state cannot deny an applicant certification “solely on the ground that the area 
it seeks to serve already has reasonably efficient and adequate service”). 
 125. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 461 (1992). 
 126. Id. at 455. 
 127. C & A Carbone, Inc., v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394–95 
(1994). 




 The Court reasoned that the local law violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause because in “practical effect and de-
sign” it bars out-of-state sanitary landfill operators from partic-
ipating in the local market for solid waste disposal.
129
 
Differential taxes and fees are especially vulnerable under 
dormant Commerce Clause principles where, as in Carbone, 
fees serve to benefit local industry at the expense of out-of-state 
firms. For example, New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach invali-
dated a state tax credit that was designed to promote in-state 
renewable fuels.
130
 Ohio argued that its law was designed to en-
courage other states to grant similar tax benefits to stimulate 
the interstate sale of ethanol. The Court, however, rejected the-
se arguments in favor of interstate coordination, found the law 
discriminated on its face, and characterized the main purpose 




These cases hinge not only on whether a fee is imposed on 
out-of-state firms, but also on whether a specific in-state indus-
try stands to benefit from the particular regulation or fee. In 
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
 
the Court invalidated a 
subsidy for in-state dairy farmers funded through a tax on both 
the out-of-state and in-state milk industry.
132 
The tax was not 
paid into the state’s general funds, but went directly into a spe-
cial fund from which only in-state farmers received subsidies.
133
 
Yet not all taxes are structured in this manner, and separating 
the tax aspect of a burden on out-of-state suppliers from the 
subsidy that benefits in-state firms can help a program to sur-
vive. For example, in General Motors v. Tracy,
134
 the Court 
evaluated Ohio’s differential tax burdens for in-state and out-
of-state natural gas suppliers, but refused to find a dormant 





 128. Id. at 393. 
 129. Id. at 389, 394. 
 130. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279–80 (1988). 
 131. Id. at 279. 
 132. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 206–07 (1994). 
 133. Id. at 188. 
 134. 519 U.S. 278, 280–81 (1997). 
 135. General Motors, which mounted a legal challenge to Ohio’s differential 
tax, was a large enough customer to purchase its gas from the open market 
(rendered competitive by national regulators) rather than bundled gas from a 
state-regulated regulated gas distribution company. However, absent competi-
tion between the local company purchasing gas and the open market serving 
General Motors, the Court reasoned, “there can be no local preference, wheth-
er by express discrimination against interstate commerce or undue burden up-
164 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:129 
 
B. STATE CLIMATE INITIATIVES AND DORMANT COMMERCE  
CLAUSE DOCTRINE 
Recent cases involving dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenges to state renewable energy programs and other climate 
initiatives indicate the doctrine’s continued relevance—
including for efforts to build out new energy infrastructure 
such as transmission lines. More than 30 states have adopted 
renewable portfolio standards (RPSs), requiring that a certain 
percentage of electricity sold to customers be supplied from re-
newable sources of power.
136
 Although there is nothing constitu-
tionally suspect about encouraging or even requiring renewable 
energy, some particular aspects of RPS standards have raised 
dormant Commerce Clause concerns. For example, some of the-
se state RPS requirements have “in-region” or “in-state” re-
strictions on power generation; some have special “multipliers” 
that favor in-state sources; and many are coupled with tax sub-
sidies favoring in-state sources.
137
 Some states also differ in 
how they allow the trading of renewable energy credits in in-
terstate commerce.
138
 Steven Ferrey has sounded a consistent 
alarm that such initiatives may violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause. As he argues, “state renewable energy programs that 
discriminate against power in interstate commerce bear some 
resemblance to earlier discriminatory programs that states set 
up for giving preference to in-state dairy and other interests.”
139
 
He is not without company on the judiciary. Judge Richard 
Posner has also raised specific concerns about some RPS re-
quirements, suggesting (albeit in dictum) that “Michigan can-
not, without violating the commerce clause of Article I of the 
Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable ener-
 
on it, to which the dormant Commerce Clause may apply.” Id. at 301. 
 136. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 47, at 484–87 (describing RPSs); Renewable 
Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWA-
BLES & EFFICIENCY (June 2015), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf. Some of these 
state laws set voluntary goals rather than mandatory requirements. See 
DAVIES ET AL., supra note 47, at 484–87.  
 137. For a summary of some of these provisions, see Brannon Denning, En-
vironmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 64 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1520 (2014). 
 138. See Daniel K. Lee & Timothy Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Back To Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine To Support State Renewable 
Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 317–18 (2013) (discussing Missouri-
bundled REC requirement).  
 139. Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The 
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable Power, 7 TEX. 
J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 60, 61 (2012); see also Ferrey, supra note 22, at 314–
19.   





Despite these claims that some state RPS standards are 
unconstitutional, to date federal appellate courts have not re-
jected any of the key features of state RPS standards.
141
 Alt-
hough it did not involve an RPS standard, the most important 
appellate court decision on the topic comes from the Ninth Cir-
cuit—Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Corey,
142
 a decision 
that Brannon Denning has heralded as a “roadmap” for courts 




This case addressed, and ultimately upheld, a state renew-
able fuel requirement that, like RPS standards, regulates how 
energy sold in the state is produced—even if that energy is pro-
duced elsewhere. In 2009, California adopted a low-carbon fuel 
standard as a part of its Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), 
which aimed to reduce California’s greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. To comply with the cap, fuel 
producers who wish to sell fuel in California are required to ei-
ther meet a specific carbon intensity requirement or to pur-
chase credits offsetting their fuel’s higher carbon content.
144
 The 
California fuel standard calculates the carbon intensity of a 
particular fuel based on its life-cycle carbon content—i.e., not 
only the carbon produced by burning the fuel, but also the car-
bon associated with producing the fuel and transporting it to 
California.
145
 In a dormant Commerce Clause challenge brought 
by Midwestern ethanol producers, a federal district court de-
termined that factoring in the distance a fuel travels from pro-
duction source to California in determining carbon content fa-
cially discriminates against out-of-state ethanol producers and 
constitutes extraterritorial regulation in violation of the 
 
 140. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 141. See Denning, supra note 137 (discussing how constitutional doctrines 
could limit state environmental initiatives); Ferrey, supra note 139, at 97; Lee 
& Duane, supra note 138, at 298. 
 142. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014). 
 143. Denning, supra note 137, at 1547. 
 144. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1085. 
 145. CA AIR RES. BD., ESTABLISHING NEW FUEL PATHWAYS UNDER THE 
CALIFORNIA LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD: PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES 
FOR REGULATED PARTIES AND FUEL PROVIDERS, 1 (Aug. 2, 2010), http:// 
www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/122310-new-pathways-guid.pdf. Carbon Intensity 
values are calculated by a standard greenhouse gas emissions equation 
(gCO2e/MJ is the unit of measurement), which provides total greenhouse gas 
emissions on a CO2 equivalent basis per unit of energy for a fuel. 





In Rocky Mountain, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision that the Cal-
ifornia fuel standard discriminates against interstate com-
merce and violates the extraterritoriality doctrine.
147 
The court 
of appeals reasoned that a law is not discriminatory simply be-
cause it has unequal effects on in-state and out-of-state inter-
ests.
148 
Instead, the question is whether California’s decision to 
assign different values to ethanol from different locations was 
based solely on origin or whether there was “some reason, apart 
from their origin to treat them differently.”
149 
If the California 
fuel standard imposes higher costs on Midwestern ethanol by 
virtue of its greater GHG emissions, there is a nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the higher carbon impact.
150 
The court noted 
that California could not successfully promote low carbon-
intensity fuels and decrease GHG emissions associated with 
those fuels if it ignored the real factors behind GHG emissions, 
which include transportation and source of electricity used to 
produce the ethanol.
151 
As the court noted, “[t]he Fuel Standard 
does not isolate California and protect its producers from com-
petition.”
152
 The court ended its discussion of facial discrimina-
tion by declaring that its conclusion “is reinforced by the grave 
need in this context for state experimentation” to address in-




The court of appeals also rejected the argument that the 
California fuel standard constitutes extraterritorial regulation 
in violation of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
154
 Instead, 
“[t]he Fuel Standard,” the court wrote, “regulates only the Cali-
fornia market.”
155
 As the court observed: 
It says nothing at all about ethanol produced, sold, and used outside 
California, it does not require other jurisdictions to adopt reciprocal 
standards before their ethanol can be sold in California, it makes no 
 
 146. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042 
(E.D. Cal. 2011). 
 147. Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1077.  
 148. Id. at 1089.  
 149. Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 
(1978)). 
 150. Id. at 1089–90. 
 151. Id. at 1090. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1097. 
 154. Id. at 1101. 
 155. Id. 
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effort to ensure the price of ethanol is lower in California than in oth-
er states, and it imposes no civil or criminal penalties on non-
compliant transactions completed wholly out of state.
156
 
Even though states may not require compliance with their 
laws in wholly out-of-state transactions, the court observed, 
“they are free to regulate commerce and contracts within their 
boundaries with the goal of influencing out-of-state choices of 
market participants.”
157
 The court of appeals directed the dis-
trict court to determine on remand whether the challenged fuel 
standard provisions discriminate in purpose or effect and, if 
not, to apply the Pike balancing test.
158
  
The Rocky Mountain decision does not mean that every 
state climate initiative or RPS standard will survive a dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge. Indeed, challenges will continue 
to be brought and some of these are having an impact on state 
regulatory initiatives. As in Rocky Mountain, there are a num-
ber of pending and recent cases that involve out-of-state energy 
producers mounting challenges to state energy policy and cli-
mate change initiatives. To take one example, a challenge to 
the Massachusetts RPS requirement that companies “enter into 
cost effective long-term contracts to facilitate the financing of 
renewable energy generation within the jurisdictional bounda-
ries of the commonwealth,”
159
 led Massachusetts to drop the in-
state requirement for long-term renewable energy contracts 
and to remove locational requirements in its RPS.
160
 Although 
not an RPS case, a district court in Minnesota invalidated Min-
nesota’s ban on use of new coal-fired power in the state in 2014 
based on the somewhat controversial “extraterritoriality” prong 
of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, with potential implica-
tion for other state climate policies that may impact interstate 
energy transactions.
161
 But in 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado’s facially neutral RPS in 
response to a dormant Commerce Clause challenge alleging 
that the law adversely impacted coal interests outside the state 
and regulated extraterritorially.
162
 The continued vitality of 
 
 156. Id. at 1102–03. 
 157. Id. at 1103. 
 158. Id. at 1107. 
 159. An Act Relative to Green Communities, ch. 169, § 83, 2008 Mass. Acts 
308, 365; 220 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17.01 (2010). 
 160. See Partial Settlement Agreement, TransCanada Power Mktg. Ltd. v. 
Bowels, No. 4:10-cv-40070 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 161. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 910–11 (D. Minn. 
2014). 
 162. Energy & Envtl. Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 
2015) (upholding Colorado RPS against a dormant Commerce Clause chal-
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these lower court challenges underscores the importance of 
courts applying consistent principles as they evaluate state 
climate initiatives under dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.  
C. REVITALIZING DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE REVIEW FOR  
INTERSTATE COORDINATION 
These kinds of recent applications of dormant Commerce 
Clause review, along with tepid applications of the doctrine by 
the Roberts Court, underscore a need to revisit its first princi-
ples. Courts frequently described the basic animating principle 
of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as the protection 
against discrimination between in-state and out-of-state com-
petitors in interstate markets.
163
 In General Motors v. Tracy, for 
example, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, stated, “[t]he 
dormant commerce clause protects markets and participants in 
markets, not taxpayers as such.”
164
 Justice Cardozo once de-
scribed the doctrine as protecting “competition between the 
states.”
165
 Such claims appear to embrace a pro-market stance 
or to even require competition between states. Taken to an ex-
treme, such a view of dormant Commerce Clause principles dis-
favors government intervention in economic markets, viewing 
the primary role of federal courts as protecting states from in-
terfering with the economic exchange of a free market econo-
my.
166
 In addition to reinforcing a neoclassical economics under-
standing of competitive markets, which would general favor 
market initiatives over regulation, such a view values federal-
 
lenge).  
 163. See Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1223 (1998). 
 164. General Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997). Justice Souter bol-
stered this vision of the dormant Commerce Clause by referencing the famous 
words of Justice Jackson: 
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer 
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty 
that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no 
home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will 
by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every con-
sumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in 
the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vi-
sion of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which 
has given it reality. 
Id. at 299 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 
(1949)). 
 165. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
 166. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 
YALE L.J. 425, 437–43 (1982); Steven G. Gey, The Political Economy of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 75–77 (1989–
90); McGreal, supra note 163. 
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ism primarily for encouraging state experimentation because it 
promotes competition between states for citizens and economic 
capital.  
It would be a mistake, however, to understand dormant 
Commerce Clause principles as endorsing a constitutional pref-
erence for private markets, requiring competitive markets, or 
mandating competition between states. To begin, dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence certainly does not disfavor 
government regulation over markets. Indeed, despite Justice 
Souter’s rhetoric preferring competitive markets in Tracy, there 
the Court appeared to carve out a safe harbor favoring state 
regulation of natural gas distribution.
167
 Established dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine suggests that when the state itself 
takes on the role of market participant it is exempt from the 
doctrine. For example, if a municipal government itself had 
built and owned the facility in Carbone, this would bring the 
monopoly within what is known as “the market-participant ex-
ception,”
168
 allowing an otherwise discriminatory state regime 
to continue to operate without constitutional challenge.  
In fact, states regulate and protect monopolies all the time 
and provide advantages to them—such as subsidies, below-
market interest rates from non-taxable bonds, bypassing state 
or local restrictions on use of municipal tax powers, etc.—as a 
way of providing incentives for investment in capital, such as 
infrastructure. For example, municipal governments often help 
to pay for privately operated infrastructure (such as waste dis-
posal facilities) through the issuance of public bonds. It is un-
derstandable that a local government would want to create a 
monopoly for firms operating such infrastructure, to help en-
sure that the operator maintains sufficient revenues to cover 
its costs and to avoid jeopardizing the government’s bond rat-
ing. Such facilities are allowed to collect charges in regulated 
rates and fees, which can serve the same basic function as a 
 
 167. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 278. 
 168. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria 
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 (1976). While many have criticized this exemp-
tion to dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it is defended as a pragmatic 
balance between competing federalism concerns. See Dan T. Coenen, Untan-
gling the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989) (discussing and exploring the market-participant ex-
ception). The exemption is limited, and is not automatically available where 
the state could expand into the market; to avail itself of the exemption the 
state must establish that it is a market participant and may not use mere con-
tractual privity to immunize downstream regulatory conduct in a market in 
which it is not a direct participant. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. 
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97–98 (1984). 
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tax. If the government itself were to build, own, and operate a 
facility, the political process would impose a general tax; how-
ever, with private operations subsidized by a state or locally en-
forced private utility, the tax implications of such projects are 
more obscured.  
One way of understanding the Court’s rejection of the 
Clarkstown flow control ordinance in Carbone is based on its 
concerns with impermissible government-aided private monop-
olies. The Town of Clarkstown, New York, for example, guaran-
teed revenue for its solid waste transfer station—it promised a 
minimum of 120,000 tons of waste per year, allowing the firm 
to make more than $9.7 million in annual revenue—and, after 
a period of five years, the town agreed to buy it for $1.
169
 
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine allows substantial state 
government intervention in the setting of prices, subsidies, and 
taxes, so long as a state does not engage in differential treat-
ment in the same market in ways that burden interstate com-
petition.  
Moreover, since dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is not 
derived from the express language of the U.S. Constitution, 
Congress can adopt a national policy that preempts, or over-
rides, the competitive market between individual states—even 
if this is not a free market policy. Under the Commerce Clause, 
there is no doubt that Congress has the express authority to es-
tablish a federal agency such as the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, giving it the jurisdiction to regulate railroad rates 
previously left to individual states. There is also no doubt that 
Congress could delegate significant authority over the siting of 
interstate electric transmission lines to FERC, as it has done 
for interstate natural gas pipelines. “Our Constitution,” the late 
Julian Eule has written, “did not attempt to solve economic pa-
rochialism by an express prohibition against interference with 
free trade. Instead, it shifted legislative power over economic 




Nor do dormant Commerce Clause principles mandate 
competition between states, as a neoclassical economic under-
standing of federalism would suggest. A number of other schol-
ars have highlighted how requiring competition between states 




 169. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 387 (1994). 
 170. Eule, supra note 166, at 430. 
 171. See id.; Gey, supra note 166, at 429–30; McGreal, supra note 163, at 
1228.  
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stead of requiring competition between states, the dormant 
Commerce Clause is focused primarily on preserving or promot-
ing reciprocity or coordination between subnational govern-
ments—to ensure that subnational regulation is not occurring 
for the kinds of parochial or isolationist reasons that make in-
terstate commerce impossible. Dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine attempts to evaluate this by looking to the purposes be-
hind subnational laws when they are adopted. These purposes 
are not always clear, nor are they always singular in nature; 
for example, a statute may have both protectionist and non-
protectionist motives.  
A good proxy for evaluating whether parochialism and 
nonreciprocal motivations, such as economic protectionism, are 
driving a law is to consider the state or local political process 
that leads to its adoption in the first place. In West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, the Supreme Court found unconstitu-
tional a Massachusetts tax and rebate scheme for milk (even 
where the tax operated neutrally without regard to the milk’s 
place of origin) where tax revenue went into a subsidy fund and 
was distributed solely to Massachusetts milk producers.
172
 As 
Justice Stevens reasoned in his majority opinion striking down 
this tax and subsidy regime: 
Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here, 
are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate 
commerce, in part because “[t]he existence of major in-state interests 
adversely affected . . . is a powerful safeguard against legislative 
abuse.” However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a 
subsidy to one of the groups hurt by the tax, a State’s political pro-
cesses can no longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, be-
cause one of the in-state interests which would otherwise lobby 
against the tax has been mollified by the subsidy.
173
 
In stark contrast to the neoclassical economics goal of 
courts protecting markets and competition in dormant Com-
merce Clause review, this “political process approach” would 
see courts as taking on more of a political process approach in 
reviewing state and local laws. Rather than protecting competi-
tion or requiring competition between states, the purposes of 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine can be understood within 
the framework of Madisonian democracy—specifically, limiting 
narrow forms of interest group rent-seeking in the state or local 
regulatory process.
174
 On this view, courts engaged in dormant 
 
 172. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994). 
 173. Id. at 200 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 
456, 473 n.17 (1981), and other cases). 
 174. For a game-theory elaboration of this view, see Maxwell L. Stearns, A 
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Commerce Clause review would play a representative-enforcing 
role, in a manner similar to what is envisioned by Carolene 
Products’ famous footnote four, which emphasizes using judi-
cial doctrine interpreting the Constitution to improve the polit-
ical process.
175
 Unlike the traditional public choice critique, 
which condemns all state and local rent-seeking, dormant 
Commerce Clause review focused on political process concerns 
would only target those rent-seeking laws that restrain com-




As a practical matter, what does this alternative approach 
mean for courts reviewing state siting or permitting plans un-
der dormant Commerce Clause doctrine? We are sympathetic to 
those (including members of the Roberts Court) who are con-
cerned about how dormant Commerce Clause doctrine invites a 
reviewing judge to sit as a super-legislature in balancing the 
substantive costs and benefits of different state laws, especially 
under Pike balancing. With this in mind, we do not propose 
that a court reviewing state or local programs under the 
dormant Commerce Clause always engage in strict scrutiny or 
open-ended balancing of the costs and benefits of regulation. 
However, we also do not believe that a reviewing court should 
give a free pass under the dormant Commerce Clause simply 
because a state claims neutrality in the treatment of regulated 
firms—especially if a program has the effect of limiting market 
entry to out-of-state firms. Nor do we believe it is appropriate 
for a reviewing court to use Pike balancing to uphold a state 
program that ignores the impacts on out-of-state firms, espe-
 
Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 175. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
John Hart Ely has famously applied the representation-reinforcing role of 
Carolene Products to equal protection jurisprudence. JOHN HART ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).  
 176. The state political process allows states, like the U.S. Congress, to 
adopt rent-seeking legislation, in the form of regulation, subsidies, and taxes. 
However, an individual state cannot use regulation to foreclose an interstate 
market or tie taxes and subsidies together to benefit in-state firms in a man-
ner that undermines interstate competition. On this view, some rent transfers 
are permissible, if not desirable, in state and local political processes. For ex-
ample, rent-seeking in the form of a neutral corporate tax exemption for utili-
ties, or rent-seeking in the setting of utility rates to favor industrial growth, is 
likely permissible, and subject only to the safeguards of the local political pro-
cess. However, rent-seeking in the form of exclusionary regulation that limits 
access to the interstate market is more suspect as an approach to regulating 
economic matters, especially where market exchange is the background norm 
as a matter of national policy. 
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cially when the affected stakeholders have no recourse at all in 
the state or local jurisdiction’s political process.  
At a minimum, if a law does discriminate on its face, the 
burden is on a state to show some legitimate regulatory pur-
pose beyond protecting incumbent firms and that there is no 
less restrictive regulatory alternative. Laws that restrict mar-
ket entry, such as limits on licensing and permitting, must be 
evaluated for their discriminatory effects and challengers 
should be allowed to present evidence of the impact of a permit-
ting or eminent domain regime on interstate markets. Where 
there is a significant burden on interstate commerce, such laws 
cannot be justified solely by making reference to protecting re-
liability or prices for in-state consumers. Instead, the assertion 
of justifications by states must occur with a decision-making 
framework that, at a minimum, shows some opportunity for the 
consideration of out-of-state benefits. As states or localities ex-
plain how regulatory actions and legislation restricting power 
supply in the wholesale market or transmission expansion 
might serve legitimate purposes, such as environmental or con-
sumer protection, courts need to play some role in evaluating 
these claims to benefits, especially where affected interests 
lacked any voice or opportunity for participation in the state 
political or regulatory process.  
Although this is a fact-bound inquiry, whether a court in-
vokes either strict scrutiny or more deferential Pike balancing, 
it is not appropriate for a court itself to assess whether, based 
on the weight of the evidence, the benefits of a state program 
justify its costs. Rather, we believe that the tradeoffs made in 
this balancing must ultimately occur in the state political pro-
cess. The relevant factual inquiry for a reviewing court is 
whether the state provided sufficient consideration of costs and 
benefits of regulation in making its own tradeoffs in the politi-
cal and regulatory process. Dormant Commerce Clause princi-
ples require that a state’s claim to benefits must be attentive to 
the political process and to concerns about its impacts on inter-
state coordination. In order to ensure that a state’s claim to 
benefits matches the lawmaking or regulatory process that led 
to a decision in the first place, the benefits must be claimed in 
the legislative or regulatory process, not merely asserted post 
hoc in briefs filed before a reviewing court. Moreover, to ensure 
that the legislative and regulatory process does not facilitate 
further protectionism or thwart interstate coordination, federal 
courts must play some role in evaluating the range of benefits 
that has been considered by a state. Specifically, a state’s 
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claims to benefits cannot be unduly narrow, and cannot be 
based on a process or substantive choice that ignores out-of-
state benefits in making a regulatory choice—any more than a 
state can ignore out-of-state harms in discriminating against 
out-of-state firms. For strict scrutiny, this is relevant to as-
sessing whether the benefits claimed by a state are legitimate, 
as well as in comparing the restrictions of various alternative 
regulatory approaches. In Pike balancing, where the burdens 
are only incidental, the Supreme Court has recognized the dan-
ger of a state making “illusory” claims to benefits where the 
broader effects of its regulations outside of its jurisdiction have 
been ignored.
177
 States can best overcome concerns with illusory 
benefits by ensuring their law making and regulatory processes 
contemporaneously provide for some mechanism, either proce-
durally or in substance, for it to consider out-of-state as well as 
in-state concerns.  
To take an example, in the Carbone case, the Town of 
Clarkstown promised to make up losses from operating the 
transfer facility at competitive rates, presumably by taking 
these losses out of its general revenues.
178
 Even if the town im-
poses the same monopoly and fees on both in- and out-of-state 
providers of service, the result of upholding it would be to allow 
a local government to take money from the public fisc to effec-
tively indemnify a private monopoly’s investors. As the Court 
held in Carbone, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prohibits 
this, especially where it significantly burdens the interstate 
market without allowing those who are potentially most affect-
ed any opportunity for consideration in the state regulatory 
process.
179
 Such a program may be upheld, in our view, but only 
if it provides some reasons contemporaneous with its enact-
ment that show the town made some effort to consider the 
broader benefits of the program and made a decision to use 
 
 177. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670–71 
(1981) (“The State’s [purported] safety interest has been found to be illusory, 
and its regulations impair significantly the federal interest in efficient and 
safe interstate transportation.”). 
 178. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 387 (1994). 
 179. Further, as in Carbone, authorizing above-market fees solely for pur-
poses of maintaining a private monopoly is especially suspect. As we move 
from local to state monopoly franchises, concerns with a single firm capturing 
the political process are perhaps weaker—a single firm that dominates munic-
ipal politics may have little power in statewide regulatory and political pro-
cesses. State-franchised monopolies may be more likely to pass constitutional 
muster, but even neutral financing arrangements may be suspect if they favor 
local enterprise and have the “practical effect and design” of impeding out-of-
state competitors. 
2015] ENERGY AND DORMANT COMMERCE REVIEW 175 
 
public money to favor one monopolist over another for legiti-
mate, and non-illusory, public reasons.  
Paying attention to the political process and broader con-
sideration of benefits in dormant Commerce Clause review is 
not inconsistent with the approach of the Roberts Court. In 
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Man-
agement Authority,
 
the Court upheld a flow control ordinance 
on a similar rationale.
180
 The Court reasoned that “the most 
palpable harm imposed by the ordinances—more expensive 
trash removal—is likely to fall upon the very people who voted 
for the laws.”
181
 Echoing Justice Stevens’ political process ra-
tionale in West Lynn Creamery, Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality 
opinion framed dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as 
protecting parties not effectively represented in the legislative 
process: 
Our dormant Commerce Clause cases often find discrimination when 
a State shifts the costs of regulation to other States, because when 
“the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it 
is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political re-




However, Justice Roberts reasoned, when the burdened 
out-of-state party was effectively represented by an in-state 
party, there was “no reason to step in and hand local business-
es a victory they could not obtain through the political pro-
cess.”
183
 After finding no facial discrimination against interstate 
commerce, Justice Roberts’ opinion also suggested that the law 
in question was not invalid under the Pike balancing test, rely-
ing on the “significant health and environmental benefits” con-
ferred on county citizens from the county processing facility.
184 
According to Justice Roberts, the ordinance “conferr[ed] signifi-
cant health and environmental benefits upon the citizens of the 
Counties” by not charging for many recycling services, produc-
ing incentives for recycling and taking responsibility for dis-





 180. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 
550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
 181. Id. at 345. 
 182. Id. (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767–
68 n.2 (1945)).  
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 346–47.  
 185. Id. A majority of the Justices did not join the part of the opinion that 
would have upheld the law under Pike balancing (Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
in particular, rejected the Pike analysis as a basis for dormant Commerce 
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Understood in a similar manner, recent appellate court 
cases applying dormant Commerce Clause review to state re-
newable energy initiatives such as Rocky Mountain may be said 
to reinforce two important federalism principles. One principle 
is promoting state experimentation in financing clean energy 
innovations and firms to advance a variety of state goals, in-
cluding job creation and environmental objectives related to 
addressing climate change. Such tradeoffs, if made in a state 
political process, are subject to considerable deference. The 
Ninth Circuit panel in Rocky Mountain observed that a few 
other states were considering similar legislation but that “[i]f 
we were to invalidate regulation every time another state con-
sidered a complementary statute, we would destroy the states’ 
ability to experiment with regulation.”
186 
The court concluded 
its discussion by stating that California “should be encouraged 
to continue and to expand its efforts to find a workable solution 
to lower carbon emissions, or to slow their rise.”
187 
Of course, at 
the extreme, programs that in fact attempt to regulate extra-
territorial conduct may be suspect, as are programs that dis-
criminate on their face to foreclose any opportunities for out-of-
state suppliers. In each of these cases, neither of the groups 
bearing the primary burden has any representation in the po-
litical process. Even still, as long as a state can justify differen-
tial treatments of in- and out-of-state suppliers in terms of 
some legitimate, non-protectionist goal, such as promoting en-
ergy reliability or sustainability or reducing carbon emissions 
to address climate change, discriminatory treatment can be jus-
tified. 
An equally important principle that Rocky Mountain rec-
ognizes is how the consideration of out-of-state benefits can 
serve to justify a state’s initiatives under dormant Commerce 
Clause principles. The consideration of such benefits (such as 
the regional, national, or global benefits associated with ad-
dressing climate change) suggests that a state is choosing to 
impose some costs on its own residents in order to promote 
norms of cooperation among states. Promoting the kind of coor-
dination that is required to address these goals is consistent 
with federalism principles such as avoiding balkanization. And 
 
Clause review). Despite this, it appears that a majority of the Justices still 
would accept Pike balancing as an approach to reviewing a state law with only 
incidental burden on interstate commerce—they just disagreed on application 
to the United Haulers facts.  
 186. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1105 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014). 
 187. Id. at 1107. 
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it also is consistent with the political process view of dormant 
Commerce Clause review endorsed by Justice Stevens, and 
more recently, the Roberts Court. Coordination in state poli-
cies, as reflected in energy market initiatives that take into ac-
count out-of-state benefits, is certainly allowed under dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine. Indeed, we maintain that it ought 
to be encouraged and, in some instances, required. When a 
state does consider these kinds of benefits in making distinc-
tions, it seems unlikely that such laws can be said to facially 
discriminate against out-of-state firms, as long as those firms 
are not foreclosed altogether from participating in the market. 
At the very minimum, a legislative record endorsing these 
kinds of interstate coordination benefits should be considered a 
“plus” factor in both Pike balancing and in assessing a legiti-
mate state purpose or comparing a least restrictive alternative 
pursuant to strict scrutiny review. 
The converse also follows. Where there is conflicting evi-
dence of legislative motive, a lack of any initiative on the part 
of a state to take into account broader interstate goals should 
be reason for a court to pause and question whether the law is 
justified. When facing a dormant Commerce Clause challenge 
to a state initiative, if a state fails to present any evidence of 
legislative motive a state should not be able to use silence or 
ambiguity to justify laws that have a discriminatory purpose or 
effect. This does not mean every state law that is silent or am-
biguous about motive will fail or be subject to scrutiny; laws 
that, on their face, do not discriminate between in-state and 
out-of-state interests are still subject to review under Pike bal-
ancing. Despite the generally deferential approach courts take 
in evaluating initiatives under Pike balancing, where state 
laws involve social initiatives that depend on interstate coordi-
nation to achieve their objectives, such silence may be reason 
for serious judicial evaluation under dormant Commerce 
Clause principles—if for no other reason than to encourage 
public officials to provide better reasons for why programs need 
to discriminate against those outside of a state.  
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL FLAWS WITH SITING AND 
EMINENT DOMAIN REGIMES   
By its very nature, interstate electric transmission line sit-
ing requires states to go beyond parochial concerns and recog-
nize larger interstate benefits associated with approving 
transmission lines. It is true that many states stand to benefit 
from approving transmission lines—especially states that are 
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consistently exporting or importing sources of power. States 
producing a surplus of renewable energy in particular stand to 
benefit economically from approving new lines. Many of these 
states face no disincentive to approve new transmission lines—
and some of these states have even reformed their transmission 
line siting procedures to recognize the particular benefits that 
siting can produce. For instance, New Mexico has enacted legis-
lation creating a state Renewable Energy Transmission Au-
thority that is authorized to participate in regional transmis-
sion forums and has the power of eminent domain to acquire 
property if needed for regional transmission projects.
188
 The 
Wyoming legislature created the Wyoming Infrastructure Au-
thority to, among other things, improve the state’s electricity 
transmission infrastructure and to facilitate the consumption of 
Wyoming energy, and authorizes the authority to use eminent 
domain to accomplish its purposes.
189
 North Dakota, Idaho, and 
Kansas have also created state agencies to address transmis-
sion planning and facilitate the export of both renewable and 
nonrenewable energy resources generated in those states and 
to address reliability concerns.
190
 Finally, Texas is able to en-
gage in more streamlined transmission planning, siting and 
eminent domain because unlike any other state, it has its own, 
in-state grid and has significant wind and solar resources as 




For all these states, there are significant economic incen-
tives to facilitate the siting of high-voltage, long distance elec-
tric transmission lines. All these states have significant renew-
able and nonrenewable energy resources, have vast amounts of 
open space within their borders, rely heavily on energy exports 
to support their economies, and have low electricity prices. 
Texas has an incentive to transport its wind resources from 
sparsely populated parts of the states to its cities and the other 
states can export their surplus energy to other states for eco-
 
 188. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-16A-4b(6) (2015) (allowing the state authority to 
coordinate and plan with other states and entities for interstate transmission); 
Id. at § 62-16A-4b(8) (providing that the state authority may exercise eminent 
domain for projects). 
 189. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-5-303(a), 304(a) (2015). 
 190. See Klass, Takings and Transmission, supra note 1, at 1142–43 (dis-
cussing state laws). 
 191. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1843–47 (discussing Texas grid 
and Texas PUC actions to facilitate transmission lines to connect wind re-
sources to population centers through the state’s Competitive Renewable En-
ergy Zone (CREZ) program). 
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nomic gain. These states recognize that to meet all these goals 
it is necessary to reduce barriers to the siting and construction 
of long-distance transmission lines.  
But not every state has similar incentives to approve new 
lines. A state in the path of a proposed line that will not receive 
or sell the electricity transported faces pressure to “hold out,” 
because a new transmission line will not produce the same 
benefits for its citizens as for citizens from neighboring states 
seeking to import or export energy. These regulatory holdout 
problems appear to occur regularly in transmission line 
siting—at a minimum they lead to delays in the siting of new 
lines (and in developers obtaining financing); at the extreme 
they may lead proposals for new lines to be dropped altogether. 
The holdout problem with transmission line siting is enabled 
and encouraged by the legal structure of public utility and 
property law in many states.  
As we highlight in this Part, substantive and procedural 
aspects of many state siting and eminent domain regimes ena-
ble the kinds of state holdout problems that can thwart coordi-
nation in energy markets. We maintain that dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrines and principles provide an appropriate 
and powerful framework for challenging such laws and practic-
es, and help to expose many of their constitutional deficiencies.  
A. NARROW ASSESSMENT OF BENEFITS BY REGULATORS IN GRID  
SITING DETERMINATIONS 
In considering approval of transmission line applications, a 
number of states limit the consideration of “need” in siting 
transmission lines to in-state benefits.
192
 In such states, a nar-
row assessment of the benefits of a new line by regulators can 
give rise to potential challenges under the dormant Commerce 
Clause. States’ refusal to take into account any benefits that 
extend beyond their own borders in considering applications for 
interstate electric transmission lines are especially problematic 
on the political process understanding of dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine, or on any understanding of its principles as fo-
cused on preserving or promoting interstate coordination.  
Such challenges may occur where a state regulator refuses 
to take into account any out-of-state or regional benefits associ-
ated with a transmission line. For example, in 2006, Southern 
 
 192. See, e.g., Brown & Rossi, supra note 1, at 721–27 (highlighting how 
many state “need” statutes explicitly, in the criteria they require regulators to 
consider, or implicitly, through incorporation of traditional state public utility 
principles, limit the assessment of benefits to native load customers). 
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California Edison proposed to build a 230-mile high voltage 
transmission line from Blythe, California to the Palo Verde Nu-
clear Generating Station, located fifty miles west of Phoenix, 
Arizona.
193
 California regulators approved the line.
194
 However, 
Arizona regulators rejected the proposal, even though Califor-
nia ratepayers would have paid for the project.
195
 One Arizona 
regulator bluntly characterized the proposed line as a “230-mile 
extension cord.”
196
 Another explained his opposition to the line: 
“I don’t want Arizona to become an energy farm for California. 
This project, if we approved it, would use our land, our air and 
our water to provide electricity to California.”
197
  
Similarly, in 2015 the Missouri PUC denied a request by 
Clean Line Energy Partners,
198
 a merchant transmission line 
company, for a certificate of convenience and necessity for the 
“Grain Belt Express” transmission line that would transport 
wind energy through four states.
199
 Prior to the final decision, 
the Missouri commissioners opposed to the project took the po-
sition that “the project wasn’t needed in the state and may not 
have an immediate benefit to Missouri ratepayers.”
200
 One 
commissioner stated that “[m]y first thought was that I need to 
 
 193. So. Cal. Edison Co., No. 07-01-040, 7–8 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 
25, 2007) (granting a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity); Press 
Release, Heather Murphy, Public Information Officer, Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 
Regulators Reject “Extension Cord for California” (May 30, 2007), http:// 
www.azcc.gov/divisions/administration/news/Devers_II_Vote.pdf. 
 194. So. Cal. Edison Co., No. 07-01-040, at 112.  
 195. So. Cal. Edison Co., Case No. 130, Decision No. 69638, 1 (Ariz. Corp. 
Comm’n June 6, 2007), http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000073735 
.pdf (denying Certificate of Environmental Compatibility).  
 196. Murphy, supra note 193, at 1. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS, http://www.cleanlineenergy.com 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
 199. See Grain Belt Express Clean Line LLC, No. EA-2014-0207, 26–27 
(Mo. Pub. Servs. Comm’n July 1, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/assets/2015/ 
07/02/document_ew_03.pdf (denying certificate of convenience and necessity 
for Grain Belt Express); see also Jacob Barker, Mo. Regulators Face Hard 
Choice over Renewable Energy Highway, ENRMIDWEST (June 14, 2015), 
http://midwest.construction.com/yb/mw/article.aspx?story_id=id:GorCQj4HR0
BvDSmjfbOKWxV0Qz25cxq0TFY8CBI_pheOenKLw0cJhcIwM2g3iXj3 (dis-
cussing positions of various Missouri PUC commissioners and status of Grain 
Belt Express in other states); Jeffrey Tomich, Clean Line Transmission Project 
in Limbo After Mo. Rejection, ENERGYWIRE (July 2, 2015), http://www.eenews 
.net/stories/1060021203 (reporting on Missouri PUC denial of certificate of 
convenience and necessity for Grain Belt Express); Jeffrey Tomich, Clean Line 
Transmission Project Gets Chilly Reception in Missouri, MIDWEST ENERGY 
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2014), http://midwestenergynews.com/2014/08/14/clean-line 
-transmission-project-gets-chilly-reception-in-missouri. 
 200. See Barker, supra note 199. 
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look after Missourians first and go from there.”
201
 
If a dormant Commerce Clause challenge were brought to 
Arizona’s or Missouri’s rejections of the proposed transmission 
lines, we maintain that these would be likely cases for courts to 
declare the actions of state regulators unconstitutional. In an-
other infrastructure context, in Dakota & Minnesota Eastern 
Railroad Corporation v. South Dakota, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of South Dakota invalidated a state statute that 
allowed the use of eminent domain for railroads in the state on-
ly for purposes of providing railroad transportation to shippers 
in South Dakota, solely for commodities produced, mined, 
grown or consumed in the state. The court found this to be a vi-
olation of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, noting how the 
law allows eminent domain “only” to benefit South Dakota in-
terests rather than merely requiring that South Dakota inter-
ests “be on par with the interests of shippers in other states.”
202
  
Arizona’s and Missouri’s rejections of the proposed trans-
mission lines raise similar constitutional concerns. Focusing 
entirely on local costs and benefits, in a manner that fails to 
consider any of the benefits outside of a state’s border, allows a 
state to serve as a regulatory holdout for reasons that, in effect, 
are parochial and even protectionist. A straightforward appli-
cation of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine shows how this is 
suspect. Such a scheme may be discriminatory on its face to the 
extent that a legislature prohibits state regulators from taking 
into account benefits to out-of-state producers and consumers 
altogether. A siting statute that allows regulators discretion to 
accept or reject a siting application based on their determina-
tions of the costs and benefits allows regulators considerable 
discretion to frame costs and benefits, and may not constitute 
per se discrimination. However, even if such a regulatory 
scheme is not facially discriminatory, it is clearly discriminato-
ry in purpose and effect. In fact, discrimination against any 
sales of Arizona produced power to California is exactly what 
the Arizona regulator characterizing the line as an “extension 
cord” intended. Likewise, the Missouri regulators denied the 
line at least in part because of the lack of in-state benefits and 
appeared to ignore the regional, out-of-state benefits. 
Application of the more deferential Pike balancing test also 
reinforces how Arizona’s and Missouri’s refusals to site the 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. South Dakota, 236 F. Supp. 2d 989, 
1016 (D.S.D. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 362 F.3d 512 
(8th Cir. 2004). 
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transmission lines are susceptible to challenge, even if their ac-
tions impose only incidental burdens on interstate commerce. 
Such a balancing test would weigh the costs of discriminating 
against sales of power to other states against the benefits. In 
the case of the Arizona line, the benefits of refusing to site the 
line are not to Arizona ratepayers; the line would have been be 
paid for by California customers. Perhaps Arizona sees the 
benefits as losing its lowest cost power to California once the 
transmission is built—the comments of the regulator hints that 
this is the case. Notably, however, that benefit would make re-
fusal to approve the line per se discriminatory insofar as it sug-
gests that Arizona is prohibiting exports to keep the cheapest 
cost energy within its borders.
203
 In its regulatory decision Ari-
zona decided to characterize the benefits of refusing to approve 
the line as primarily environmental, with respect to its poten-
tial impact on watershed, desert, wildlife, and archaeological 
sites. This may justify discrimination under the Pike balancing 
test. However, these benefits need to be placed explicitly in the 
balance along with other benefits. To the extent Arizona down-
played or explicitly ignored any out-of-state benefits this should 
be considered as negative factors in the weight of the evidence 
regarding its justifications for refusing to approve the line. 
Similar arguments apply to Missouri’s rejection of the Grain 
Belt Express transmission line, to the extent state regulators 
appear to have ignored the out-of-state, regional benefits, and 
instead focused only on the alleged paucity of benefits for Mis-
souri residents. The fact that this line was proposed by a mer-
chant developer whose business model would not allow it to 
serve Missouri retail customers makes the denial even more 
constitutionally suspect, insofar as this appears to favor a 
state’s incumbent utility developers over non-utility developers. 
An approach to dormant Commerce Clause review that is 
attentive to concerns about the political process preserving op-
portunities for interstate coordination would look with particu-
lar suspicion on a regulatory decision that was made based on 
such limited consideration of the benefits. Arizona’s refusal to 
site the proposed transmission line benefitted in-state inter-
ests—especially consumers who did not want to pay market 
rates for electricity or producers who did not want to face new 
 
 203. See, e.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 
339 (1982) (“The order of the New Hampshire Commission, prohibiting New 
England Power from selling its hydroelectric energy outside the State of New 
Hampshire, is precisely the sort of protectionist regulation that the Commerce 
Clause declares off-limits to the states.”). 
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competition—but this also worked to harm interests (out-of-
state suppliers and consumers) who have little or no mecha-
nism to participate in the political process that holds a state’s 
regulators or politicians accountable. The Missouri regulators 
also cited the lack of benefits to Missouri ratepayers as the rea-
son for opposing the line without considering the wind genera-
tors and ratepayers in other states that would benefit. Such an 
analysis seems to undermine the kinds of coordination benefits 
reinforced by dormant Commerce Clause principles. Such bene-
fits could be framed in terms of promoting grid reliability or in 
terms of the climate change benefits associated with greater 
deployment of renewable energy sources on the grid; but ignor-
ing them altogether seems to border on the exact kind of dis-
crimination that dormant Commerce Clause doctrine prohibits. 
What seems most troubling is that there appears to be no evi-
dence that Arizona and Missouri regulators even considered 
these benefits or weighed them in making their final decisions.  
B.  WHITTLING DOWN “PUBLIC USE” AND EMINENT DOMAIN  
POST-KELO 
In Kelo v. City of New London,
204
 the Supreme Court held 
that a city’s decision to take private property by eminent do-
main in connection with a private redevelopment project was a 
“public use” under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
based on the city’s determination that the project would rein-
vigorate the city core and increase its tax base. In finding this 
“economic development taking” valid under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the Kelo court emphasized that states could define public 
use more restrictively in their state statutes or constitutions. 
As the Court noted, “our public use jurisprudence has wisely 
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of af-
fording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public 
needs justify the use of the takings power.”
205
  
More than half the states have revised their eminent do-
main laws to limit the economic development takings at issue 
in the Kelo case itself and to more narrowly define what consti-
tutes a “public use” for general eminent domain purposes—
primarily to expand protections for private property owners.
206
 
By whittling down the categories of “public use,” many of these 
revisions are certain to make the exercise of eminent domain 
authority to facilitate energy exports potentially more difficult. 
 
 204. 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).  
 205. Id. at 483. 
 206. See Klass, Takings and Transmission, supra note 1, at 1093–94. 
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While many of the statutes states have enacted post-Kelo spe-
cifically provide that electric transmission lines or pipelines 
remain a public use, others do not, creating the potential that 
proposed projects that were once thought to be a classic public 
use might not be when analyzed under a state’s post-Kelo legis-
lation. Some states have in effect limited the ability to use emi-
nent domain to authorize a “pass through” transmission line or 
pipeline sponsored by an out-of-state applicant.  
For instance, in 2013, the Missouri Supreme Court held in 
Missouri ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan
207
 that a port authority could 
not exercise eminent domain to build a “loop track” to accom-
modate larger train cars that would bring oil from the Bakken 
shale area of North Dakota to the port area where the oil would 
travel down the Mississippi River to refineries on the Gulf 
Coast.
208
 In reaching its decision, the court recognized that Mis-
souri had long ago adopted a broad interpretation of “public 
use” but that post-Kelo state legislation prohibited all condemn-
ing authorities from acquiring property by eminent domain “for 
solely economic development purposes.”
209
 Because the port au-
thority had testified that the purpose for the taking was to 
promote jobs and commerce through the use of the additional 
rail facilities, the court found that the taking was solely for 
economic development purposes and thus was contrary to the 
state statute.
210
 Even though the port authority also testified 
that the taking “would improve river commerce”
211
 the court 
found that the only improvement to river commerce would be 
by drawing more economic development to the area.
212
  
While the Jackson case involved a rail track linked to in-
terstate river transport rather than an interstate electric 
transmission line, it raises potential concerns for lines being 
built in states with bans on economic development takings 
where the purpose of the line is to export the state’s renewable 
resources, which could be argued to promote economic devel-
opment. Moreover, to the extent lines are being built in states 
solely for reliability or energy export purposes, it is much easier 
for landowners opposing the line to argue first, that there is no 
 
 207. 398 S.W.3d 472 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 208. See David A. Lieb, Associated Press, Mo. Court Blocks Eminent Do-
main by SEMO Port Authority, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN (May 29, 2013), 
http://www.semissourian.com/story/1973038.html. 
 209. Jackson, 398 S.W.3d at 478. 
 210. Id. at 481–82. 
 211. Id. at 480. 
 212. Id. at 481–82. 
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in-state public use to justify the taking and, second, that bans 
on economic development takings are an additional obstacle to 
eminent domain. Indeed, even before Kelo, there were many 
examples of state courts requiring significant local benefits in 
order for an interstate electric transmission line to exercise em-
inent domain authority. The Mississippi Supreme Court in 
1984, in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, refused to 
allow the exercise of eminent domain authority for a high-
voltage power line between Mississippi and Louisiana because 
“the terms ‘public necessity’ and ‘public use’ . . . contemplate 
use by the citizens of this state” and Mississippi customers 
would not directly benefit from the line.
213
 This is consistent 
with a Florida court’s 1967 decision in Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 
where the court held that a state’s eminent domain power ex-
ists “only within its territorial limits for the use and benefit of 
the people within the state.”
214
  
Even in states where courts have recognized the regional 
benefits of interstate transmission to allow the use of eminent 
domain, they have been careful to point out that such power 
cannot be used without a showing of a significant, local public 
use. For instance, in 1934, the Indiana Supreme Court held in 
Shedd v. Northern Indiana Public Service Corp. that a utility 
could exercise eminent domain authority to build an interstate 
line and rejected arguments that a state-regulated public utili-
ty could not exercise eminent domain authority for any use in 
interstate commerce, as opposed to solely in-state uses.
215
 In so 
holding, however, the court made it clear that the state “will 
take care to use this power for the benefit of its own people” but 
would not refuse to exercise it simply because “the inhabitants 
of a neighboring state may incidentally partake of the fruits of 
its exercise.”
216
 Likewise, in Square Butte Electric Cooperative v. 
Hilken,
217
 the North Dakota Supreme Court in 1976 upheld em-
inent domain authority for a transmission line to provide power 
from North Dakota to members of an electric cooperative in 
 
 213. 460 So. 2d 107, 113 (Miss. 1984). 
 214. Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). 
 215. Shedd v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 188 N.E. 322, 325–27 (Ind. 1934). 
 216. Id. at 325; see also Oxendine v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 423 N.E.2d 612, 
617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (citing Shedd and allowing exercise of eminent do-
main authority for an interstate electric transmission line to improve reliabil-
ity for in-state customers even while it provided power to out-of-state custom-
ers and finding that the authority was “to furnish electricity to the ‘public’ not 
to Indiana residents alone”). 
 217. 244 N.W.2d 519, 530 (N.D. 1976). 




 The court found that North Dakota residents re-
ceived benefits of increased electric service reliability even 
though the direct energy benefits of the line went primarily to 
out of state interests.
219
 While the opinion embraces a broader 
vision of public use than many other states, the Court was care-
ful to say that the law in the state was that in-state residents 
must receive a “substantial and direct benefit”
220
 (not merely an 
indirect advantage) even if other states are also benefited and 
that the benefit to the state must be “attached to the territorial 




Notably, at least some state regulators and courts appear 
more willing to consider regional need and not require in-state 
need in the context of interstate energy transportation infra-
structure. For instance, in 2010, in Pliura Intervenors v. Illinois 
Commerce Commission, the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld 
the grant of eminent domain authority to an interstate oil pipe-
line on a showing of public need.
222
 Like interstate electric 
transmission lines and unlike interstate natural gas pipelines, 
authority for siting interstate oil pipelines rests with the 
states.
223
 In that case, the interveners argued the commission 
erred in considering regional, national, and global need in 
granting eminent domain authority rather than solely the need 
of Illinois citizens.
224
 The court deferred to the commission’s 
broader view of public need based on the fact that the statute 
did not require the narrow view.
225
 Thus, at least in Illinois, 
there does not appear to be a requirement that there be a sig-
nificant in-state benefit as opposed to a public benefit more 
generally, in order to obtain eminent domain authority for an 
interstate oil pipeline. 
These cases illustrate the tension between federal policies 
promoting increased interstate transmission of electricity and a 
state regulatory system designed primarily to recognize in-
state interests. It is perhaps understandable why a state court, 
 
 218. Id. at 530–31. 
 219. Id. at 525. 
 220. Id. (citing Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 83 A.2d 177 (Conn. 1951)). 
 221. Id. (citing Clark v. Gulf Power Co., 198 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1967), and Grover Irrigation & Land Co. v. Lovella Ditch, Reservoir & 
Irrigation Co., 131 P. 43, 55 (Wyo. 1913)). 
 222. Pliura Intervenors v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 942 N.E.2d 576, 584–85 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
 223. See supra Part I.C. 
 224. Pliura Intervenors, 942 N.E.2d at 584. 
 225. Id. 
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especially one that is subject to judicial elections, may wish to 
weigh the costs of the line for its own citizens, while not paying 
any attention to the benefits of the line that are felt by out-of-
state interests. But this also will encourage individual land-
owners to challenge eminent domain proceedings and may lead 
states in the path of a proposed interstate line to refuse to ap-
prove the line where the in-state benefits are small and there 
are more significant out-of-state benefits.  
Such a myopic analysis of benefits in defining “public use” 
not only interferes with federal policies regarding interstate 
lines; it also allows existing monopolies such as incumbent 
state utilities to extract monopoly rents because, in effect, the 
law limits the ability of competing transmission operators 
(which are often not based in that state) to obtain reciprocal ac-
cess to eminent domain authority. To be sure, the Kelo Court 
emphasized deference to state public use determinations, which 
also means that states are free to adopt a broader, regional ap-
proach to public use as illustrated above by the North Dakota 
and Indiana cases.
226
 But in the context of an interstate electric-
ity market and strong federal policies in favor of planning and 
constructing interstate transmission lines, dormant Commerce 
Clause principles provide a plausible constraint on a state’s 
narrow assessment of benefits in its definition of “public use”—
much as it allows for constitutional challenges to narrow bene-
fit assessments under state utility siting laws. We return to the 
force of this argument below.  
C. BANS ON OUT-OF-STATE APPLICANTS AND DIFFERENCES IN  
PARTICIPATION RIGHTS 
State laws not only limit what can be considered in approv-
ing a siting or eminent domain application. Some states also 
limit who can apply or, through strict intervention standards, 
limit the procedural rights of participants in the siting or emi-
nent domain process. Although basic procedural questions of 
state law are seldom questioned beyond the Due Process 
Clause, the interstate transmission siting issue highlights how 
such procedures also can effectuate violations of dormant 
Commerce Clause principles and doctrine.  
Under the utility laws of many states, out-of-state appli-
cants are banned altogether from applying for either siting or 
eminent domain powers. Some state siting authorities lack the 
power to even consider applications where a state legislature 
 
 226. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482–83 (2005). 
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has not authorized them to do so. Many state siting statutes 
limit applicants to those who are a “public utility”—which typi-
cally means that a firm is taking on an obligation to serve retail 
customers in that particular state.
227
 For example, Florida’s Su-
preme Court has interpreted its power plant siting statute to 
limit siting to only those suppliers who are Florida utilities or 
who have contracts with Florida utilities.
228
 The court reasoned 
that the state’s siting statute “was not intended to authorize 
the determination of need for a proposed power plant output 
that is not fully committed to use by Florida customers who 
purchase electrical output at retail rates.”
229
 Effectively, mer-
chant power plants—who sell power in bulk power markets but 
do not serve retail customers—are precluded from locating in 
Florida for purposes of entering the interstate market unless 
they have already contracted to serve Florida customers.
230
  
In the context of electric transmission lines (as opposed to 
power plants themselves), many states limit the ability to ob-
tain a siting certificate to “public utilities.” The question of 
whether merchant lines, which are often in the business of 
building interstate lines to transport renewable energy and 
compete with incumbent public utilities, can obtain a certificate 
or exercise eminent domain authority at all is unclear in many 
states—because they cannot apply to obtain approval in the 
first instance. Recent research shows that some states express-
ly ban merchant lines from exercising eminent domain authori-
ty, other states expressly allow merchant lines to exercise emi-
nent domain authority, and the law is unclear in a majority of 
states.
231
 This research concludes that as of 2013, Florida, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin grant merchant transmission lines 
eminent domain authority by statute; Kansas and Oklahoma 
grant such rights through PUC orders; Illinois, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, and Nebraska prohibit merchant transmission 
lines from exercising eminent domain by statute; Arkansas and 
Connecticut prohibit such rights through PUC orders; and all 
other states have statutes that are unclear and lack a definitive 
interpretation by a state PUC or court.
232
 Moreover, the issue is 
 
 227. See Klass, Takings and Transmission, supra note 1, at 1124–26. 
 228. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See id. 
 231. See Klass, Takings and Transmission, supra note 1, at 1124–26.  
 232. Id.; see also id. at app. A. Notably, although the Tampa Electric Co. 
case placed limits on the ability of power plants to obtain a siting certificate 
unless it was selling significant power to Florida utilities, the Florida statute 
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arising more frequently, especially where legislation is ambigu-
ous, as the cases below illustrate. 
For instance, in 2008, the Montana Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality issued a Certificate of Compliance for the 
Montana-Alberta Tie Line, a 214-mile merchant transmission 
line now owned by Enbridge Energy, to transmit primarily re-
newable energy from Montana to Alberta, Canada.
233
 When the 
proposed transmission line developers began eminent domain 
proceedings against a landowner in the path of the line, the 
landowner argued there was no public use justifying eminent 
domain because the proposal was for a merchant line rather 
than a public utility that would serve Montana customers. The 
district court agreed and dismissed the eminent domain action. 
Soon after, the Montana legislature enacted a law that made 
clear that all transmission lines that receive a certificate of 
compliance are a per se public use and authorized to exercise 
eminent domain. Thus, when the district court’s decision went 
up to the Montana Supreme Court on appeal, the court re-
versed based on the new legislation. While there were addi-
tional challenges to the new law, the courts ultimately dis-
missed them and the line went into service in 2013.
234
 The 
initial lawsuit challenging eminent domain authority illus-
trates, however, the uncertainty in this area of law, the wide 
divergences in state approaches, and the difficulty these uncer-
tainties pose to those who wish to invest in interstate trans-
mission lines. 
Indeed, the issue has come up in many states that have not 
responded with clarifying legislation, like Montana, to address 
ambiguities in statutes or outright bans that prevent out-of-
state merchant transmission companies from competing with 
in-state utilities to build interstate transmission lines. For ex-
ample, Clean Line Energy Partners has proposed five, separate 
direct current (DC) high voltage transmission projects to bring 
wind energy to population centers in different parts of the 
country. One of the lines, the Plains & Eastern Clean Line, is 
 
governing electric transmission lines explicitly includes “independent trans-
mission systems” within the definition of an “[e]lectric utility” eligible to apply 
for siting certification and to exercise eminent domain. See FLA. STAT. 
§§ 403.522(12), 403.531(1), 403.539 (2015).  
 233. See Montana-Alberta Tie-Line, ENBRIDGE, http://www.enbridge.com/ 
DeliveringEnergy/Power-Transmission/Montana-Alberta-Tie-Line.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
 234. Montana-Alberta Tie Line Now Fully Operational, POWERING 
ALBERTA (Sept. 18, 2013), http://poweringalberta.com/2013/09/18/montana 
-alberta-tie-line-now-fully-operational. 
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designed to bring wind energy from the Oklahoma Panhandle 
region to southeastern states.
235
 As part of the siting process, 
Clean Line sought a certificate of public convenience and ne-
cessity along with a separate certificate of environmental com-
pliance and public need from the Arkansas Public Service 
Commission in 2010.
236
 The Arkansas PUC denied Clean Line’s 
request without prejudice because such certificates could only 
be granted to a “public utility” in the state. Because Clean Line 
was proposing the line as a “merchant” transmission project, it 
was not assuming any obligation to provide customers retail 
electric service and therefore could not obtain public utility sta-
tus.
237
 The Arkansas PUC stated: 
The difficulty the Commission now faces is that the law governing 
public utilities was not drafted to comprehend changes in the utility 
industry such as this one—where a non-utility, private enterprise en-
deavors to fill a void in the transmission of renewable power that is 
much needed but for which the Commission is unable to afford any 
regulatory oversight. . . . [T]he Commission’s decision is based on that 
fact that it cannot grant public utility status to Clean Line based on 
the information about its current business plan and present lack of 
plans to serve customers in Arkansas.
238
 
The Kentucky PUC issued a similar decision in 2013, find-
ing that a transmission-only company could not obtain a certifi-
cate of public convenience or exercise eminent domain authori-
ty because it would not be providing retail utility service in 
Kentucky subject to PUC jurisdiction.
239
 A Kentucky state cir-
 
 235. See Welcome to the Plains & Eastern Clean Line Website, CLEAN LINE 
ENERGY PARTNERS, http://www.plainsandeasterncleanline.com/site/home (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
 236. PLAINS & EASTERN CLEAN LINE, CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS 9 
(2011) http://www.cleanlineenergy.com/sites/cleanline/media/resources/1222 
Update_ PLains_Eastern_August2011.pdf (seeking partnership with South-
western Area Power Administration to use federal siting authority under the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 to address limitations in state law preventing Clean 
Line from obtaining state approval for lines). 
 237. Id.; In re Plains & E. Clean Line L.L.C., Docket No. 10-041-U, Order 
No. 9, 9–10 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.apscservices 
.info/pdf/10/10-041-u_41_1.pdf.  
 238. In re Plains & E. Clean Line L.L.C. at 10–11. 
 239. AEP Kentucky Transmission Co., Case No. 2011-00042, 2013 WL 
2639388, at *3–6 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 10, 2013); see also CONN. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 16-50x(b), 16-50z, 16-244p (2015); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. 
Huschke, 409 A.2d 153, 155 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979); Transenergie U.S. Ltd., 
No. 00-06-14, 2000 WL 33121599, at *4 (Conn. Dep’t Pub. Util. Control Oct. 
18, 2000) (holding that Transenergie was not an “electric distribution compa-
ny” because it did not provide retail or distributed electric service within the 
state and thus could not exercise eminent domain to build a transmission 
line); James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and De-
velopment of Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71, 
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cuit judge also ruled in 2014 that a proposed 1100-mile natural 
gas liquids pipeline, known as the Bluegrass Pipeline, does not 
qualify for an eminent domain in the state because it would not 
have an “off-ramp” allowing the delivery of such liquids to Ken-
tucky customers.
240
 Despite a post-Kelo state law that clearly 
recognized an exception for “common carriers” the court em-
phasized that the pipeline was not “in public service” and 
therefore not regulated as a utility in the state, so the Blue-




In addition, many states have long-standing laws or prac-
tices (sometimes grounded in obscure adjudicative orders) that 
grant incumbent utilities a “right of first refusal” to construct 
electric transmission lines that connect to the local utility. Alt-
hough FERC Order No. 1000 placed some limits on these kinds 
of preferences for incumbent utilities in FERC jurisdictional 
tariffs and agreements, it did not disturb rights of first refusal 
under state siting and permitting laws. As James Hoecker and 
Douglas Smith describe in a 2014 article, many state first re-
fusal preferences apply only to low-voltage, local transmission 
lines and thus do not interfere with Order No. 1000’s goal of fa-
cilitating regional transmission planning and encouraging non-
utility, merchant companies from participating in order to cre-
ate a more dynamic market for regional transmission lines.
242
 
Still, Hoecker and Smith identify multiple states that in recent 
years have created broad first refusal preferences for incum-
bent utilities that include such rights for high-voltage, inter-
state lines, including Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
North Carolina, and Nebraska.
243
 They observe that these state 
laws “threaten to prevent or significantly reduce the competi-
tion that FERC sought to establish in Order No. 1000 among 
multiple potential transmission developers for large regional 
 
86–88 (2014) (discussing state barriers to transmission line siting and high-
lighting proceedings in Kentucky, Arkansas, and Missouri). 
 240. Robert H. Thomas, Kentucky Judge: Private Pipeline Lacks Eminent 
Domain Power—Not in Public Service Because It Is Transporting Through 




 241. Kentuckians United to Restrain Eminent Domain, Inc. v. Bluegrass 
Pipeline Co., No. 13-CI-1402, 2014 WL 10246980, at *11–17 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Mar. 
25, 2014), aff’d, No. 2014-CA-000517-MR, 2015 WL 2437864 (Ky. Ct. App. May 
22, 2015).  
 242. Hoecker & Smith, supra note 239, at 88–90. 
 243. Id. 





In a recent series of decisions reviewing RTO compliance 
filings under FERC Order 1000, FERC Chairman Bay has ex-
pressly questioned whether state right of first refusal laws vio-
late the dormant Commerce Clause.
245
 From a practical litiga-
tion perspective, challenging such preferences and bans on out-
of-state or non-utility applicants under dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine could well prove difficult. Often, all that may 
be present is summary dismissal of an application as beyond 
the authority of the regulator, under a statute that was enacted 
decades earlier and without any legislative history or, worse 
still, under a longstanding practice supported by an obscure 
agency adjudicative order that only state agency lawyers or re-
peat players in the state siting process will know. Litigants 
challenging such regimes are likely to be relying on facial chal-
lenges, rather than as applied challenges—especially where the 
application of the statute gives no discretion to the regulator.
246
  
However, whether a facial or as applied challenge is 
brought, under dormant Commerce Clause doctrine these dis-
tinctions that prohibit out-of-state applications would appear to 
be per se discriminatory. Even if not discriminatory on their 
face, there is little doubt that such restrictions are discrimina-
tory in their purposes and effect. In some instances, there may 
be legislative history indicating a clear discriminatory purpose. 
Yet this seems unlikely as many state siting statutes that limit 
applicants to “public utilities” are relics of an earlier era.  
Until the 1990s, transmission lines were primarily built by 
vertically-integrated utilities serving customers in a particular 
state, not large utilities serving customers across multiple 
states.
247
 However, in today’s energy industry, where power is 
more actively supplied and traded in interstate commerce, the 
effects of this kind of discrimination seem obvious—merchant 
transmission lines simply will not be proposed at all in these 
states. This can potentially restrict sources of energy from oth-
er states from becoming available to customers in that state at 
all. Perhaps such a distinction is grounded in goals such as en-
 
 244. Id. at 90; see also Linda L. Walsh & Noelle J. Coates, Walking the 
Fuzzy Bright Line: The Legality of State ROFR Laws Under FERC Order 1000, 
PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 2013, at 40. 
 245. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 246. If the statute is not clear, this arguably would give some discretion to 
the regulator, and an “as applied” challenge would seem appropriate. But if all 
the regulator does is conclusively assert that it lacks authority, a reviewing 
court is effectively forced to address the issue as a facial challenge.  
 247. See supra Part I.B. 
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suring the protection of ratepayers within a state, but a state 
would be hard-pressed to maintain that limiting out-of-state 
applicants for new transmission lines is the least discriminato-
ry alternative available to it when it comes to protecting rate-
payers. For example, state regulators typically retain authority 
over retail rates and have ample opportunity to protect custom-
ers through retail ratemaking proceedings. Foreclosing the 
ability of out-of-state sources to become available to customers 
in the first place does not even allow state regulators the oppor-
tunity to compare the relative costs of power in the first in-
stance. Moreover, merchant transmission companies, unlike 
public utilities, do not receive any recovery at all from ratepay-
ers but instead take on the full risk of the project’s success in 
the market—a fact that could make any effort to justify such 
restrictions on the grounds that they benefit in-state consumers 
appear “illusory” at best. 
Indeed, even under the more deferential Pike balancing 
test, these kinds of bans raise dormant Commerce Clause prob-
lems. In challenging such bans under this more deferential 
test, applicants may be hard pressed to lay out a full legislative 
record of a discriminatory purpose at the time of enactment—
especially where many of these statutes were codified decades 
ago. However, given the changes that have occurred to the util-
ity industry over the past several decades, and the obvious in-
centives incumbent utilities in some states may have to use old 
statutes to foreclose any new entrants, states should not be al-
lowed to use the passage of time to evade the reach of dormant 
Commerce Clause principles. At a minimum, Pike balancing 
would require a state to explain why, given the way the indus-
try operates today, the restrictions on who can apply under its 
siting statute continue to produce legitimate benefits under the 
Pike balancing test, in terms of consumer and environmental 
protection. A state’s failure to provide such an explanation 
alone should lead to failure to meet the Pike balancing test—
and this seems to be relevant whether the challenge is a facial 
challenge or an applied challenge to the state siting regime. It 
is also well established that, when such explanations are pro-
vided, they must be non-illusory, suggesting that using blanket 
consumer protection rationales as a basis for bans on out-of-
state applicants is likely to fail as a legitimate justification un-
der both a strict scrutiny and Pike analysis.  
Even states that do not ban out-of-state applicants outright 
or prioritize local over out-of-state applications may face prob-
lems with their siting or eminent domain procedures under 
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state law to the extent that these procedures work to, in effect, 
impose a significant burden on interstate commerce. This can 
occur most obviously through procedural limits on intervention 
or standing. Many states have laws or established practices 
that allow incumbent utilities to drive the energy resource 
planning process
248
 or that leave regulators considerable discre-
tion to limit intervention in utility siting or eminent domain 
proceedings to those who are most directly affected by a regula-
tor’s decision.
249
 It is not always clear that an out-of-state firm 
would have an opportunity to intervene in a proceeding where 
it is not filing a transmission proposal application. Even if the 
right to intervene in a siting or eminent domain proceeding can 
be established, the costs of participating in a state siting pro-
ceeding will typically be higher for any out-of-state firm, who 
may need to hire local counsel and assert their interests from 
afar. As compared to an in-state firm already providing service, 
any out-of-state firm seeking to enter and provide new service 
to a market is likely to face a serious disadvantage in a siting 
process (where it would typically be requesting approval in the 
face of opposition from an incumbent firm) or in an eminent 
domain process (where it would be challenging a narrow “public 
use” assertion). 
In allowing challengers to litigate whether Virginia’s hos-
pital certificate of need program procedures produce a signifi-
cant burden on out-of-state applicants and whether any legiti-
mate local benefits can justify it, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, in Colon Health Centers v. Hazel, recog-
nized how the lack of a level procedural playing field in a state 
permitting process that bans access to a market can raise seri-
ous questions under dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
250
 The 
challengers were out-of-state firms that sought to offer radiolo-
gy and imaging services in Virginia. They faced the same certif-
icate of need requirement as did Virginia firms, but they did 
not wish to undergo the state’s “lengthy, costly, and unpredict-
able application process,” which takes years and provides mul-
tiple opportunities for in-state firms to challenge the appli-
 
 248. See, e.g., Uma Outka, Siting Renewable Energy: Land Use and Regu-
latory Context, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1041, 1058–59 (2010) (describing the plan-
ning process in Florida).  
 249. Typically, state administrative procedure would allow those directly 
affected to intervene, but absent an express statutory standard recognizing 
out-of-state firms, intervention is likely relegated to the discretion of agency 
regulators.  
 250. Colon Health Ctrs. of Am., L.L.C. v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 542–45 (4th 
Cir. 2013). 




 The court highlighted the challenger’s allegations that:  
Virginia’s certificate-of-need program grants established, in-state 
economic interests the power to obstruct the market entrance of new, 
primarily out-of-state competitors in two ways. First, by requesting 
fact-finding conferences, established interests can dramatically 
lengthen the application process, thus increasing the costs and uncer-
tainty borne by the applicant. Second, objecting firms may influence 
the substantive outcome of the process through an effective adversar-
ial presentation at the conference.
252
 
Notably, without even getting to the substance of the cer-
tificate standards, the court observed how the state’s interven-
tion process can “grant[] a structural edge to local firms: if an 
established, in-state facility desires to expand its operations, it 
will necessarily face one fewer objector than would an out-of-
state firm that seeks to enter the market de novo—itself.”
253
 
Although the court did not find Virginia’s scheme unconstitu-
tional, it reversed a district court dismissal of the challenger’s 
claim. In requiring further factual findings, it noted that even if 
the law is not facially discriminatory, “[t]he Pike test requires 
closer examination . . . when a court assesses a statute’s bur-
dens, especially when the burdens fall predominantly on out-of-
state interests.”
254
 Similarly, if an out-of-state competitor can 
present actual evidence of a discriminatory effect on interstate 
commerce under a state siting or eminent domain transmission 
process, it may be able to successfully mount a similar dormant 
Commerce Clause attack to a state regime’s claim to procedural 
neutrality. 
 
IV.  TAILORING STATE LAWS AND PRACTICES TO 
FACILITATE COORDINATION   
In a 2014 case dismissing a legal challenge to an interstate 
natural gas facility, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit stated: 
Given the choice, almost no one would want natural gas infrastruc-
ture built on their block. “Build it elsewhere,” most would say. The 
 
 251. Id. at 540–41. 
 252. Id. at 544. 
 253. Id.  
 254. Id. at 545 (quoting Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Jim’s Motorcycle, Inc., 401 
F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2005)). On remand, the district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendant after evaluating additional evidence, including 
new evidence of the benefits of the program by the state and statistical evi-
dence that the approval rate for in-and out-of-state firms was roughly equal. 
See Colon Health Ctrs. of Am., L.L.C. v. Hazel, No. 1:12-CV-615, 2014 WL 
5430973, at *7 (E.D. Va. Oct. 23, 2014). 
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sentiment is understandable. But given our nation’s increasing de-
mand for natural gas (and other alternative energy sources), it is an 
inescapable fact that such facilities must be built somewhere. Dec-
ades ago, Congress decided to vest the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission with responsibility for overseeing the construction and 
expansion of interstate natural gas facilities. And in carrying out that 
charge, sometimes the Commission is faced with tough judgment calls 
as to where those facilities can and should be sited.
255
  
The same considerations are present in siting and permit-
ting of interstate electric transmission lines: the nation’s citi-
zens want the lights to stay on but no one wants a high-voltage 
transmission line where it may interfere with their home, view, 
favorite park, or farming operations.
256
 The difference, of 
course, between the siting of interstate natural gas facilities 
and interstate electric transmission lines is that many decades 
ago, Congress recognized the potential holdout problem in the 
context of natural gas facilities and created a federal process to 
override parochial concerns in favor of the national interest.
257
 
Because of the history of the development of the electric grid, 
which did not require a national infrastructure until recent 
years, there is no federal authority to override state holdouts as 
there is in the natural gas context. Certainly, Congress could 
address this issue and create a federal siting process for inter-
state electric transmission lines just as it did decades ago for 
natural gas pipelines and related facilities. We and other schol-
ars have analyzed the benefits and costs of such a transfer of 
authority—as well as the dim prospects for such a transfer in 
today’s political climate—in earlier work.
258
 Of course, there are 
other approaches as well, such as Congress creating a regional 
transmission siting framework or FERC issuing more orders 
along the line of Order No. 1000 to require regional collabora-
tion between states and utilities and attempting to preempt 
state barriers to out-of-state entrants that exist currently 
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100 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (dismissing claims that FERC’s decision to approve a nat-
ural gas compressor station was arbitrary and capricious and a violation of the 
Natural Gas Act). 
 256. See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 78, at 6–11; McLaughlin, supra note 
15, at 404–05.  
 257. See generally Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting 
Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947 (2015) (dis-
cussing the reasons behind Congress’s enactment of the Natural Gas Act and 
the law’s provisions relating to interstate natural gas pipeline siting). 
 258. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 259. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. pt 35, supra note 64; Hoecker & Smith, supra note 
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Our central claim in this Article is that dormant Commerce 
Clause review provides an independent ground for courts to 
help overcome regulatory holdout problems and promote inter-
state coordination where state laws are challenged, even absent 
any affirmative federal action on the issue. We maintain that, 
in considering dormant Commerce Clause challenges to such 
regimes, courts must, at a minimum, evaluate political process 
concerns with state regulation in order to help ensure that the 
state decision-making framework allows for some consideration 
of out-of-state benefits. This Part clarifies the scope and practi-
cal implications of our proposal.  
We first explain in Section A why dormant Commerce 
Clause challenges will likely have different implications for 
state policies governing siting and eminent domain for inter-
state energy transportation infrastructure, like electric trans-
mission lines, than for many state energy and climate policies 
such as RPSs and renewable fuel mandates. Put simply, there 
are greater concerns over state holdouts and assembly prob-
lems in cases involving physical, interstate infrastructure—
concerns that threaten the very heart of interstate markets in 
energy. We discuss some limitations on the scope of our pro-
posal, in terms of its application to different problems, includ-
ing the problem of inertia and state regulatory inaction.  
Then in Section B, building on Part III, we provide some 
practical guidance for state legislatures and PUCs, with the 
goal of retaining state control over the process without discrim-
inating against out-of-state actors or interstate energy mar-
kets. We recommend that state legislatures adopt laws explicit-
ly allowing and clarifying the appropriateness of considering 
“regional benefits” of new transmission lines, rather than focus-
ing solely on instate benefits in both siting and eminent domain 
proceedings. We also recommend that post-Kelo limits on eco-
nomic development takings designed to protect private proper-
ty owners include clear safe harbors for interstate projects that 
operate as common carriers in interstate commerce or that are 
regulated as public utilities at the federal level. Finally, our 
study of state siting and eminent domain regimes highlights 
how states must be attentive to how the regulatory process can 
create structural barriers for out-of-state participants. States 
should eliminate statutory provisions that prevent out-of-state 
actors from applying for certificates or exercising eminent do-
main authority, so long as they meet other statutory require-
 
239, at 88–90 (discussing first refusal rights and their impact on interstate 
competition to build regional transmission lines); see also supra Part III.C. 
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ments that ensure the state can fully consider the environmen-
tal and economic costs and benefits of the line. Some states 
have moved in this direction, but many states have not. Our 
study of state siting and eminent domain regimes shows how, 
in the absence of state legislative and PUC actions to reduce 
barriers to out-of-state stakeholders, project developers who are 
not able to avail themselves of state siting or eminent domain 
approval are in a strong position to bring dormant Commerce 
Clause challenges to many existing state laws, PUC decisions, 
and court decisions denying market entry or eminent domain 
authority to out-of-state applicants. 
 A. SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT TO CONSIDER  
OUT-OF-STATE BENEFITS 
We have argued for a revitalized approach to dormant 
Commerce Clause review aimed at reducing the kinds of regu-
latory holdouts that can impair coordination in energy policy 
and markets. This approach requires courts to evaluate wheth-
er state siting and eminent domain regimes allow for consider-
ation of benefits beyond a particular state’s jurisdiction. The 
approach has doctrinal implications: it opens up the possibility 
for challenges based on evidence of a significant discriminatory 
effect, requires states to provide a justification for discrimina-
tory approaches, and also requires states to show that any dis-
criminatory regimes are narrowly designed to achieve this pur-
pose. Even where there is not a significant discriminatory 
impact, it also challenges regulators to articulate non-illusory 
reasons for nonreciprocal differences in procedures and consid-
erations. Under such an approach to dormant Commerce 
Clause review, courts would focus on whether the political and 
regulatory process under which decisions are made allows for 
some consideration of benefits that are not based solely on in-
state interests. We also see courts as having some role in eval-
uating the legitimacy of state justifications, but only insofar as 
those claims of benefits do not meet the threshold for being le-
gitimate and non-illusory. Importantly, our proposal is not a 
roving invitation for reviewing courts to balance or engage in 
cost-benefit analysis themselves. In this sense, it addresses ob-
jections to dormant Commerce Clause review raised by those 
who are concerned about the institutional capacity of courts to 
second-guess the policy choices of politically accountable state 




 or the incommensurability problem present-
ed with cost benefit balancing by judges.
261
  
Our approach to revitalizing dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine in reviewing state energy infrastructure siting regimes 
may appear to be in tension with the spirit, if not the results, of 
some recent cases addressing constitutional challenges to state 
climate change initiatives and renewable energy programs. To 
date, when presented with dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenges to initiatives to promote renewable and clean energy 
programs, reviewing courts have been largely deferential to 
state programs.
262
 For example, in Rocky Mountain, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld California’s low carbon fuel standard, applying a 
deferential approach to assessing the state’s objectives in ad-
dressing climate change.
263
 According to the Ninth Circuit, the 
state’s objectives in addressing the carbon impacts of various 




As we highlight above, this approach serves to encourage 
state experimentation and flexibility in addressing the difficult 
problems presented with climate change. Indeed, some envi-
ronmental law scholars praise such forms of “adaptive federal-
ism,” to the extent that they allow climate policy to flourish in 
states even when Congress and federal regulators have taken 
no action at all.
265
 Shouldn’t judicial deference to these kinds of 
pro-environment state regulatory programs be a cause célèbre 
for anyone concerned with the environment? And why shouldn’t 
a reviewing court apply a similarly deferential approach to 
 
 260. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (citing Roberts Court deci-
sions that raise concerns about unnecessary judicial supremacy in dormant 
Commerce Clause review).  
 261. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 
888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the inappropriateness of a scale 
analogy or of balancing where there is incommensurability, because “[i]t is 
more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is 
heavy”).  
 262. See supra Part II.B. There are, of course, exceptions, but these seem 
largely limited to dicta, settled cases, or outlier district court opinions. See su-
pra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
 263. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th 
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2874 (2014). 
 264. Id. at 1105–06. 
 265. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: 
The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 1796, 1827–31 (2008); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Cli-
mate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1102, 1158–61 (2009) (lauding “itera-
tive federalism schemes” as “innovative regulatory mechanisms [which] can 
have the best of both worlds”). 
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state decisions not to site interstate transmission lines—which 
also might be said to promote greater experimentation in state 
approaches to addressing energy issues? Our analysis of the 
holdout problem created by transmission line siting and emi-
nent domain regimes shows why linking deference to federal-
ism has only limited appeal. 
To begin, it is not at all clear to us that Rocky Mountain is 
inconsistent with the approach to dormant Commerce Clause 
review that we advance in this Article. As the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized in its Rocky Mountain decision, in adopting its pol-
icies the State of California emphasized not only the benefits to 
firms and residents in the state, but it also placed a particular 
emphasis on the out-of-state benefits created by addressing the 
grave and difficult problems associated with carbon emis-
sions.
266
 The court even lauded California for not isolating the 
state’s renewable fuel market.
267
 This is exactly the approach 
we are urging in the evaluation of transmission line siting. As 
we have argued, state and local weighing of benefits beyond its 
borders serves to provide for a broader set of political process 
concerns in siting decisions and promotes the forms of inter-
state coordination reinforced by dormant Commerce Clause 
principles by helping to overcome the isolated parochialism re-
flected by holdouts. Rocky Mountain reinforces how the consid-
eration of out-of-state benefits by a state can be considered as 
evidence that a state is not relying solely on protectionist mo-
tives in adopting an approach to promoting clean energy.  
Nevertheless, although there are some definite parallels, 
dormant Commerce Clause review of interstate transmission 
line siting and eminent domain decisions is required to address 
a special type of problem that is not presented by new state re-
newable fuel standards. Rocky Mountain allowed the state to 
consider out-of-state benefits; but our approach to dormant 
Commerce Clause review would go even further, requiring the 
state or local government to allow for consideration of such 
benefits even where a legislature or regulator has failed to do 
so on its own. In the context of energy infrastructure, unlike 
state fuel standards, the necessity of coordination among regu-
lators for any jurisdiction to succeed with its regulatory initia-
tives makes the consideration of out-of-state benefits even more 
essential. In the context of multi-jurisdictional energy infra-
structure projects, a single state or local holdout can keep an 
infrastructure project from going forward. By contrast, with 
 
 266. Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1097. 
 267. Id. at 1092, 1096. 
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state renewable electricity or renewable fuel standards, coordi-
nation across jurisdictions is not necessarily a predicate to pur-
suing any particular state’s regulatory goals. California, for ex-
ample, can pursue its regulatory goals in addressing the carbon 
content of fuel consumed in California regardless of how Arizo-
na or Wyoming regulates the carbon content of fuel. Although 
coordination may be desirable to advancing California’s inter-
ests, from a broader regional or national policy basis, its re-
newable fuel program does not require coordination between 
adjacent states or rely on any type of interstate reciprocity.
268
  
Yet another structural feature of energy infrastructure sit-
ing presents a unique concern for a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge that new renewable energy requirements do not. 
Many energy infrastructure-siting regimes are steeped in 
longstanding (and sometimes even informal) traditions of local 
land use regulation or in siting statutes that predate the con-
temporary changes that have transformed energy industries.
269
 
This temporal mismatch between energy infrastructure siting 
regimes and the current issues facing the industry creates a 
particularly disturbing opportunity for incumbent monopolists 
who wish to use state laws to isolate themselves from interstate 
markets: such regimes allow regulators to hide behind the 
complacency of the status quo, sometimes even benefitting in-
state monopolists at the expense of out-of-state firms seeking to 
compete in the provision of interstate energy infrastructure for 
power supply. This concern is of undoubtedly greater signifi-
cance in assessing the federalism aspects of energy infrastruc-
ture siting than in assessing statutes of more recent vintage, 
such as state renewable energy requirements. The environmen-
tal and land use concerns that are sometimes used to justify 
continued state or local attention to siting transmission lines 
are not unimportant—and we are not arguing that they should 
be ignored or preempted by federal law—but courts also should 
not allow them to be used as a silent subterfuge to protect in-
cumbent monopolists under outdated regulatory programs that 
 
 268. Some renewable energy programs may be more steeped in coordina-
tion or reciprocity between states than others. For example, some state RPS 
programs rely on regional coordination in renewable energy certificate trad-
ing. To the extent that a state RPS program depends on this kind of coordina-
tion and states in the same regional market fail to recognize nonreciprocal 
terms in their renewable electricity regulations, a similar dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis would be appropriate in evaluating state renewable energy 
program features that pose a similar holdout challenge.  
 269. This particular concern of fitting new wine into old bottles with 
transmission line siting is also discussed in Brown & Rossi, supra note 1. 
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no longer fit the reality of interstate energy markets.  
Nor should regulators be allowed to hide behind legislative 
action or to claim that their permitting and siting regimes 
should escape constitutional scrutiny because they are not au-
thorized to act. As has been recognized in other constitutional 
contexts, the failure of government regulators to act against the 
backdrop of changing circumstances can still constitute a con-
stitutional violation. Christopher Serkin, for example, argues 
that the ecological threat presented by sea level rise may either 
require the government to act to address it or, if it fails to do so, 
pay damages under the Takings Clause.
270
 Similarly, it does not 
seem relevant to whether there is a dormant Commerce Clause 
violation if legislators or regulators fail to act to approve a line 
at all. Instead the question is whether existing state siting and 
permitting regulatory regimes, as reflected in the laws and 
practices of a state, present an obstacle to the federalism values 
the doctrine is designed to promote. A dormant Commerce 
Clause violation can just as readily occur through a process 
that presents a structural obstacle to out-of-state firms
271
 as it 
can through the more conventional approach of challenging the 
discriminatory aspects of a substantive decision by state regu-
lators. 
B. PROMOTING COORDINATION BY ELIMINATING  
DISCRIMINATORY BARRIERS 
As explained in Part III, the energy infrastructure siting 
regimes in states around the country contain significant barri-
ers that prevent out-of-state developers or merchant transmis-
sion lines from receiving approval, including eminent domain 
authority, to build lines, or from exercising the same procedural 
rights as incumbent utilities in the siting process. This serves 
as a significant obstacle to entry in interstate electricity and 
electricity infrastructure markets. These barriers include: (1) 
regulator refusals to site lines based on a narrow assessment of 
benefits; (2) refusing to grant eminent domain authority to a 
transmission line or other energy infrastructure project based 
on post-Kelo legislation or by requiring local need to establish 
“public use”; or (3) explicit bans on out-of-state applicants for 
transmission line siting permits or use of eminent domain au-
 
 270. See Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty 
To Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 390 (2014).  
 271. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently recognized 
this as potentially problematic in the health certificate of need approval pro-
cess. See supra Part III.C and accompanying text. 
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thority in the state, or other differences in procedural rights.
272
 
This Subpart first considers actions states can take to elimi-
nate some of the more significant substantive legal barriers 
under state law to facilitating coordination in interstate energy 
markets and to ensure that the decisions of regulators do not 
run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. It then suggests 
ways in which states can correct the procedural aspects of state 
siting and eminent domain laws that serve to limit any new 
market entry to incumbent utilities, effectuating a form of 
structural discrimination against interstate commerce. In both 
instances, we maintain, would-be applicants have a compelling 
basis for bringing challenges to state regimes under the 
dormant Commerce Clause, providing state legislatures and 
regulators a propitious opportunity to reform and clarify their 
laws to correct any constitutional deficiencies.  
 1. Correcting the Myopic Stance in Siting and Eminent  
Domain Decisions 
State regulators often balance factors in making decisions 
to approve new energy infrastructure projects in ways that that 
impose a significant discriminatory burden on interstate com-
merce. To take a common example discussed above, state siting 
laws will often explicitly limit a regulator’s considerations in 
assessing “need” to in-state interests—as may occur when a 
state regulator is charged by statute to favor the protection of 
native load customers—presenting deficiencies under dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine. Where such statutes expressly 
foreclose any consideration of out-of-state benefits, or limit the 
“need” determination to benefits for in-state customers only, 
they are particularly likely to face dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges. States that continue to use siting statutes that 
make “need” determinations dependent on only in-state bene-
fits should make revising their laws to allow for a broader 
range of considerations a high legislative priority, given their 
legal vulnerability. 
If a state’s legal regime completely forecloses any consider-
ation of out-of-state benefits, this is especially problematic un-
der the dormant Commerce Clause. As we show above, even re-
gimes that leave regulators discretion to weigh different costs 
and benefits can be successfully challenged where regulators 
fail to balance any out-of-state considerations in making a deci-
sion. Open-ended discretion to regulators may, in theory, allow 
 
 272. See supra Part III. 
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for consideration of a broader range of benefits in approving 
“need” based on the public interest. However, to the extent that 
regulators exercise their discretion narrowly and refuse to con-
sider any out-of-state benefits, instead focusing entirely on in-
state beneficiaries in making their public interest determina-
tions, their decisions may be legally vulnerable.  
For those states with ambiguous statutory language—
leaving regulators discretion to adopt a narrow determination 
of “need” or “public use” that excludes regional need or regional 
benefit—state legislatures can amend their statutes to clarify 
that it is appropriate and, in fact, required, for PUC regulators 
and courts to consider regional need and regional use along 
with local need and local use in their decision-making process. 
This would address the dormant Commerce Clause deficiencies 
in the Arizona Corporation Commission’s rejection of the pro-
posed Southern California Edison interstate transmission line 
and the Mississippi and Florida cases discussed in Part III that 
excluded regional need and regional public use in barring out-
of-state project applicants and the interstate transmission lines 
in question.
273
 State regulators or courts can readily accomplish 
the same result without new legislation by recognizing regional 
need and regional use in interpreting ambiguous statutes to 
avoid dormant Commerce Clause violations, as the Illinois 
Court of Appeals did in the Pliura Intervenors case.
274
 State 
courts considering such language would be well advised to con-
sider this as a straightforward application of a canon to inter-
pret ambiguous language to avoid constitutional deficiencies.  
With regard to post-Kelo barriers to economic development 
projects, some state “public use” statutes limit or ban the use of 
eminent domain for solely economic development purposes, 
such as the Missouri law at issue in the Jackson case.
275
 After 
Kelo, how a state defines “public use” for Takings Clause pur-
poses is generally subject to considerable legislative deference. 
However, our analysis highlights how state definitions of “pub-
lic use” should not escape the scrutiny of federal courts, espe-
cially for large-scale energy infrastructure projects that require 
the approval of multiple jurisdictions. Instead, we maintain 
that, at some level, the dormant Commerce Clause must con-
strain states from adopting unduly narrow assessments of 
“public use” if they limit or ban interstate infrastructure devel-
 
 273. See id. 
 274. 942 N.E.2d 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
 275. 398 S.W.3d 472, 476 (Mo. 2013); see also supra notes 207–12 and ac-
companying text. 
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opment. In other words, even after Kelo, the dormant Com-
merce Clause provides an independent constitutional con-
straint on a state’s definition of “public use.” 
One objection to imposing a dormant Commerce Clause 
constraint on state definitions of “public use” may be to argue 
that state or local eminent domain powers are a sovereign func-
tion and therefore exempt from dormant Commerce Clause 
scrutiny under the market participant exemption.
276
 However, 
the mere fact that a state or local government exercises its 
power as a sovereign, such as invoking eminent domain author-
ity, does not limit the application of the dormant Commerce 
Clause.
277
 To take one example, zoning is a well-accepted sover-
eign power of state and local governments. Yet it has been held 
that a state or local government cannot appeal to its status as a 
sovereign in exercising zoning powers to prohibit a retail chain, 
such as Starbucks, from operating in its jurisdiction through a 
discriminatory zoning ordinance.
278
 Certainly, the market par-
ticipant doctrine can serve as an established exception to the 
dormant Commerce Clause where the state itself acts as a con-
sumer or producer in an interstate market, but the Court con-
sistently has subjected sovereign functions such as taxation to 
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.
279
 Eminent domain au-
thority is no different, and it is thus appropriate to apply the 
dormant Commerce Clause to the assessment of “public use” by 
state courts, legislatures, and regulators—especially in scenar-
ios where there is reason to be concerned about adverse effects 
 
 276. Thanks to Ilya Somin for raising this point with us.  
 277. Indeed, the Court has recognized limits to the market participant ex-
ception when states exercise sovereign functions. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex 
rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (holding that a state’s property interest in 
water does not limit dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny of a ban on the ex-
port of water without first obtaining a permit).  
 278. See Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839, 842 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding 
unconstitutional a local ordinance that would have prohibited chain retail es-
tablishments, such as a Starbucks coffee shop).  
 279. See supra Part II, which discusses tax cases such as General Motors v. 
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997). Even if state ownership and control were recog-
nized as the formal touchstone for application of dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine, there still would need to be some qualifications to its application. 
Clearly, if a state itself owns a public road, this would not allow the state to 
limit its use by out-of-state trucks—a state may be able to avail itself of the 
market participant exemption when it is one of many participating in the 
market, but courts still seem wary of extending this exemption to dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine where the state owns the entire market or controls 
all of the means of commerce in a market. See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 168, at 
450 (citing state-owned highways as an example of the principle that states 
cannot “deny all forms of state-made benefits to outsiders”).  
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on interstate coordination.  
Post-Kelo, as state legislatures have renewed their atten-
tion to spelling out what is and is not a public use, the resulting 
enactments vary considerably. To their credit, many post-Kelo 
enactments expressly recognize traditional common carrier or 
regulated utility projects as automatically qualifying for “public 
use.” At first blush, this kind of a safe harbor would appear to 
be designed to address the kind of problem we have highlight-
ed. However, if through ambiguity this safe harbor is somehow 
tethered to a narrow understanding of benefits by the utility 
regulator, there is still a possibility that, even in a state that 
enacts a common carrier or public utility safe harbor, such a 
regime can impose a significant burden on interstate commerce 
and present the same problems as an overly narrow definition 
of “need” in siting statutes. In Kentucky, for example, despite a 
defined apparent safe harbor in post-Kelo legislation for com-
mon carriers and utilities, state courts still seem to interpret 
“public use” narrowly to exclude an entity that is not a utility 
delivering energy to customers in the state.
280
 To avoid such is-
sues, states should consider expressly recognizing as a “public 
use” any facility that is required to transport energy as a com-
mon carrier or utility in interstate commerce, even if that 
transport is not regulated by the state. To the extent that this 
definition of “public use” is tied to federal regulation of oil pipe-
lines or electric transmission lines to achieve goals such as en-
ergy reliability, it certainly does not threaten the ability of a 
state legislature to continue to address the kinds of economic 
development purposes with which Kelo was most concerned.  
Other post-Kelo laws that ban economic development leave 
still more ambiguity. To the extent that this is the case, a party 
bringing a dormant Commerce Clause challenge should be al-
lowed some opportunity to present evidence of whether a re-
gime significantly burdens interstate commerce. In Jackson, 
the post-Kelo statute was applied to an in-state port authority 
and the court did not find any preference for in-state economic 
development over out-of-state or regional economic develop-
ment.
281
 Any burden on interstate commerce on these facts was 
thus incidental, at most, and subject to more deferential re-
view. This would therefore be evaluated under the more defer-
ential Pike test, which weighs the benefits of the ban and the 
burdens on interstate commerce. As we have argued, however, 
even under Pike, an assessment of benefits for such a regime 
 
 280. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 281. Missouri ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.2d 472, 478–83 (Mo. 2013). 
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can still be illusory. At a minimum, a jurisdiction would be re-
quired to show it did not foreclose the consideration of out-of-
state benefits in adopting or applying the “public use” defini-
tion. But it will prove difficult for challengers to win such cases 
without good evidence that the state legislature had a discrim-
inatory purpose or was seeking to foreclose any evaluation of 
broader benefits. When state legislatures enacted their post-
Kelo bans (mostly in the late 2000s), most state legislatures 
were focused on local government exercise of eminent domain 
for urban and suburban redevelopment and perceived abuses of 
that authority—much like the facts in Kelo itself. It is unlikely 
state legislatures even contemplated how the new legislation 
might apply to efforts to build energy transportation infrastruc-
ture.  
The best way for states to avoid these kinds of federalism 
challenges to eminent domain authority is through legislative 
clarity in statutory definitions of “public use.” States concerned 
with limiting abuses of economic development post-Kelo should 
focus on correcting actual abuses of their eminent domain pro-
cess—whether by governmental entities or private parties—
rather than using the occasion for new legislation to expand 
bans on new market entrants. Indeed, such bans do nothing to 
hinder abuses of eminent domain by government actors or by 
the most powerful private energy developer interests in a state, 
which is typically an incumbent private monopolist. To avoid 
dormant Commerce Clause problems the focus should be on en-
suring that any regulator’s failure to site pipelines or transmis-
sion lines does not effectuate a significant burden on interstate 
commerce, and that the consideration of out-of-state benefits 
associated with a line is not completely prohibited in post-Kelo 
eminent domain statutes. Clarifying the availability of a “pub-
lic use” safe harbor for interstate infrastructure facilities that 
are regulated as common carriers or in the public interest at 
the federal level seems to be the safest path for a state to avoid 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges to post-Kelo eminent 
domain statutes.  
2. Fixing Procedures that Run Afoul of Dormant Commerce  
Clause Principles 
Perhaps many states will chose to retain the status quo in 
siting and eminent domain law and practices out of inertia, to 
protect incumbent utilities, or as a result of political pressure 
by in-state actors who either want to retain a competitive ad-
vantage in interstate energy markets or wish to limit the con-
208 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:129 
 
struction of such infrastructure for environmental or other rea-
sons. Indeed, as described in Part III, in recent years, several 
states have enacted new right-of-first-refusal laws that give in-
cumbent utilities a significant advantage over merchant 
transmission lines in obtaining permission to construct regional 
transmission lines in those states. The approach to dormant 
Commerce Clause review that we advance in this Article offers 
out-of-state firms an option to do more than only challenge the 
substance of a state decision, as routinely occurs in dormant 
Commerce Clause litigation. We also propose that disfavored 
applicants be allowed to use the dormant Commerce Clause to 
challenge procedures that expressly exclude them from apply-
ing for transmission lines permits or exercising eminent do-
main, as well as structural processes that impose a significant 
burden on interstate commerce. 
As noted in Part III, many states have explicit statutory 
bans on out-of-state applicants applying for transmission line 
siting permits or exercising eminent domain authority. These 
statutes generally state that only “public utilities” can apply for 
permits or exercise eminent domain authority, thus preventing 
merchant transmission lines and other out-of-state applicants 
from building and operating interstate transmission lines that 
cross the state. In light of the regional nature of the electric 
grid, the need for transmission expansion throughout the coun-
try to meet reliability and clean energy goals, and the oppor-
tunity for states to benefit from electricity exports or imports, 
particularly renewable energy exports and imports, it is critical 
for states to address these issues. 
To the extent that there are express bans on out-of-state 
applicants or laws that limit participation in the market for 
building new interstate transmission lines or exercising emi-
nent domain to incumbent utilities, such laws may well dis-
criminate against interstate commerce. For instance, Maryland 
law states that only “electric companies” may build transmis-
sion lines in the state and may only exercise eminent domain if 




 282. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-207(b)(3) (2015). This statutory section 
also contains a right of first refusal in favor of the incumbent utility in the 
portion of the state where the line is proposed. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN. 
PUB. UTIL., § 7-103(a) (1998) (“An electric company incorporated in Maryland 
may . . . construct a power line . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 1-
101(h)(1) (2015) (“‘Electric company’ means a person who physically transmits 
or distributes electricity in the State to a retail electric customer.”); MD. CODE 
REGS. 20.79.04.01 (2015) (setting forth requirements of application for build-
ing a transmission line, including the need for the project to meet demands for 
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Nebraska law permits only an “electric supplier” defined as a 
public power district, municipality, or cooperative to exercise 
eminent domain for transmission lines;
283
 and New Hampshire 
grants eminent domain authority for transmission lines or re-
lated infrastructure only to a “public utility” where necessary to 
meet “reasonable requirements of service.”
284
 
Moreover, dormant Commerce Clause case law would ap-
pear to support standing by merchant transmission operators 
and others who would benefit from an enhanced transmission 
line market to challenge such laws even without the need to go 
through the application process and obtain a denial. In general, 
courts have found that both in-state and out-of-state market 
participants may challenge state laws on dormant Commerce 
Clause grounds if they can show the law’s restrictions limit the 
plaintiff’s access to the interstate market in question.
285
 Howev-
er, to the extent standing or ripeness may be an issue, the out-
of-state applicant or non-incumbent utility can apply for a per-
mit or seek to exercise eminent domain and then, if there is a 
denial, can argue on appeal that the denial violates dormant 
Commerce Clause principles. This could have been a basis for 
appeal in the Arizona case involving Southern California Edi-
son if the out-of-state utility had chosen to appeal the Arizona 
decision. 
 
service and impact on the economy of the state); Maryland Office of People’s 
Council, Regulatory Activities—Electricity—Significant Cases, MARYLAND 
http://www.opc.state.md.us/RegulatoryActivities/Electricity/SignificantCases 
.aspx#PSC_Case_No_9223 (stating, in connection with an interstate PATH 
transmission line proceeding, that “[t]he PSC agreed with OPC’s position that 
Maryland law permits only an electric company—that is, a company that 
transmits or distributes electricity to retail customers—to apply for and re-
ceive a CPCN, and that Potomac Edison could not just file on behalf of PATH, 
an affiliate company”). 
 283. NEB. REV. STAT. § 70-301 (2009); see id. §§ 70-1014.02(1)(a) (2011), 70-
1014.02(6) (2011), 76-710.04(3)(a) (2010). 
 284. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371:1 (2012). 
 285. Florida Trans. Serv., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 703 F.3d 1230, 1256 
(11th Cir. 2012) (summarizing numerous Supreme Court dormant Commerce 
Clause decisions, including standing requirements, and stating that “the 
dormant Commerce Clause may bar . . . laws that protect local economic inter-
ests and squelch outside competition, even where in-state and out-of-state 
companies are affected”); Freeman v. Corzine, 629 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2010); 
S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2003); see also 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (setting forth con-
stitutional standing requirements as follows: first, the plaintiff must have suf-
fered “an injury in fact,” meaning that the injury is (a) “concrete and particu-
larized” and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’” 
(quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)); second, the injury 
must be traceable to the defendant’s challenged action; third, it must be “like-
ly” rather than “speculative” that a favorable decision will redress the injury). 
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Indeed, as discussed in Part III, there is some precedent 
that states cannot discriminate against out-of-state entities in 
connection with the exercise of eminent domain to build energy 
transportation infrastructure. For instance, in Kern River Gas 
Transmission Co. v. Clark County, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Nevada held that a statute that limited eminent 
domain authority for natural gas pipelines to projects that 
promoted “local” concerns rather than the interests of inter-
state commerce violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
286
 Sim-
ilarly, in Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corp. v. South 
Dakota, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota 
found that a South Dakota statute that allowed eminent do-
main only when it had the purpose of benefitting South Dakota 
interests discriminated against interstate commerce and vio-
lated dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as applied to a pro-
posed interstate railway line.
287
  
For states with express bans on out-of-state applicants, a 
court would likely apply strict scrutiny to the law in question, 
as the courts did in the Nevada and South Dakota cases just 
described, and it would be very difficult for states to demon-
strate that these bans on out-of-state applicants are for a legit-
imate, non-protectionist purpose and that there are no less dis-
criminatory means that would advance this purpose.
288
 Indeed, 
for most states, the reason for the bans is to protect incumbent, 
in-state utilities—if there was a reason at all rather than mere-
ly an assumption decades ago that only public utilities would 
build transmission lines. With regard to whether there are less 
discriminatory means of ensuring that transmission lines are 
built only when there is a public need and only for a public use, 
 
 286. Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Clark Cty., 757 F. Supp. 1110, 
1118–19 (D. Nev. 1990) (“[A] state statute requiring the exercise of eminent 
domain over public lands to be dependent on whether it is ‘necessary’ to local 
concerns, rather than the concerns of interstate commerce, is a clear violation 
of the Commerce Clause.”). 
 287. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp. v. South Dakota, 236 F. Supp. 2d 989, 
1016 (D.S.D. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 362 F.3d 512 
(8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a statute stating that the “exercise of the right of 
eminent domain is a public use consistent with public necessity only if the use 
of eminent domain has as its purpose providing railroad transportation to 
shippers in South Dakota, for commodities produced, manufactured, mined, 
grown, used, or consumed in South Dakota” violates dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine because it “purposefully discriminates against out-of-state 
commerce on its face”); see also Saxer, supra note 8, at 1505, 1538–40 (discuss-
ing the Kern River and Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad cases). 
 288. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the burden on states to justify mar-
ket bans that discriminate against interstate commerce or impose a significant 
burden on out-of-state participants in interstate markets). 
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in each case, state regulators can ensure they have sufficient 
regulatory oversight over the out-of-state applicant, by requir-
ing them to apply for status as a state-regulated “independent 
transmission company” or similar entity and requiring them to 
meet the same standard as incumbent utilities to build the line 
or exercise eminent domain authority. Moreover, any given 
transmission line has the same potential impacts on private 
property rights in the state regardless of whether the line is 
built by an incumbent utility or a merchant transmission com-
pany, again, assuming the same regulatory oversight of in-state 
and out-of-state actors. Even if a court were to find that such 
laws were nondiscriminatory, the same factors above would ap-
pear to weigh in favor of a dormant Commerce Clause violation. 
It is unclear how the state benefits from excluding out-of-state 
applicants other than for the discriminatory purpose of protect-
ing incumbent utilities and the burdens of such exclusion, in 
the form of burdening state efforts to meet state RPS require-
ments and impeding development of renewable electricity, are 
significant. 
With regard to state right-of-first-refusal laws, which give 
a hard or soft preference to incumbent utilities in siting and 
permitting transmission lines, FERC has stated expressly that 
its Order No. 1000 does not invalidate state preferences but in-
stead merely limits their use and application in FERC jurisdic-
tional tariffs and agreements.
289
 FERC found that a federal 
right of first refusal has “the potential to undermine the identi-
fication and evaluation of more efficient or cost-effective solu-
tions to regional transmission needs, which in turn can result 
in rates for Commission-jurisdictional services that are unjust 
and unreasonable or otherwise result in discrimination by pub-
lic utility transmission providers.”
290
 This speaks very clearly to 
the right of first refusal in FERC-approved tariffs and as a part 
of the tariff filing in RTO markets. However, FERC did not 
preempt or take a clear position on state laws that contain a 
right of first refusal—in fact it expressly stated it did not in-
tend to “limit, preempt, or otherwise affect” any state or local 
law regarding the construction of transmission facilities, in-
cluding “authority over siting or permitting of transmission fa-
cilities.”
291
 To the extent that these are not incorporated into 
tariffs filed with FERC, they are not preempted or otherwise 
 
 289. Order No. 1000, FERC Stats. & Regs., 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 253 (2011). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. pt. 227. 
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affected by Order No. 1000. In fact, FERC itself recognized 
“that removing federal rights of first refusal in Commission-
jurisdictional tariffs and agreements will not eliminate all ob-
stacles to transmission development that may exist under state 
or local laws or regulations and, therefore, may not address all 




As FERC Chairman Bay has recently noted,
293
 it remains 
an open question whether the in-state preference in a state 
right of first refusal law conforms to dormant Commerce 
Clause principles. If such a right of first refusal is directly pro-
vided to a municipal utility or government-owned entity, in ef-
fect the law is providing a preference to the government, it thus 
becomes a “market participant,” and that removes its regulato-
ry treatment from any dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. 
However, as FERC recognized, to the extent some states con-
tinue to allow private incumbent utilities a right of first re-
fusal, these can continue to serve as a significant obstacle to 
transmission line development in interstate commerce. We be-
lieve that there are compelling arguments that any conclusive 
state right of first refusal favoring incumbent firms, in the form 
of a non-rebuttable presumption, runs afoul of dormant Com-
merce Clause principles. By providing incumbent utilities a 
right of first refusal to build high-voltage transmission lines, 
whether or not these are a part of regional transmission plans, 
states act to discriminate against merchant lines and other out-
of-state actors that would potentially create a more vibrant in-
terstate power market and reduce electricity costs for states 
and regions, particularly for renewable energy.
294
 Regardless of 
the validity of state rights of first refusal under Order No. 1000 
as matter of federal preemption, such laws appear to constitute 
a facial violation under dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. A 
merchant transmission or other non-incumbent utility company 
that does not qualify for a first refusal preference and is not 
given the opportunity to build a regional transmission line un-
der the same criteria as an incumbent utility could seek to chal-
lenge any line approved under such a preference. States seek-
ing to avoid constitutional challenges to their siting regimes 
would be well advised to revisit these kinds of preferences for 
 
 292. Id. pt. 257. 
 293. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 294. Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(discussing the importance of renewable energy, transmission grid expansion, 
and grid reliability). 
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private incumbent utilities—and to ensure that, to the extent 
that any in-state priority exists at all, it is rebuttable and 
serves some legitimate purpose.  
More generally, the examples we discuss in this Article 
highlight how states must be attentive to their eminent domain 
and siting procedures to ensure that the framework of state 
laws and practices does not, in practical effect, impose a signifi-
cant burden on interstate commerce. The particular interstate 
coordination problem with transmission siting shows how en-
trenched state procedures can present serious obstacles for new 
entrants in interstate energy markets. Even if a state does not 
ban out-of-state applicants, the participation rights afforded in 
the application and hearing process may systematically disfa-
vor out-of-state applicants. A process that routinely favors the 
ability of in-state incumbents to object to new proposals may 
present a form of structural discrimination against out-of-state 
applicants, and is subject to a facial challenge under dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine. For example, if a challenger is able 
to show a disparity in outcomes between incumbent and out-of-
state firms that imposes a significant burden on interstate 
commerce, a state would need to show a legitimate public pur-
pose and the availability of no less restrictive procedural alter-
native in order for its program to stand. It may prove difficult 
to bring facial challenges to existing regulatory procedures, as 
it will inevitably require extensive factual development by chal-
lengers, but evidence of the discriminatory burden such proce-
dures impose in different scenarios can better allow state regu-




By eliminating incumbent rights of first refusal and re-
forming intervention rules to accommodate out-of-state firms 
on neutral terms, states may better ensure an even-handed sit-
ing approval process for new transmission lines. In many cases, 
the state statutes limiting siting permits or eminent domain 
authority to public utilities were drafted many decades ago 
when merchant transmission lines and regional transmission 
organizations did not exist, wind and solar energy for electricity 
was negligible, transmission lines were built exclusively by 
public utilities that also provided in-state retail service, and the 
need for interstate electricity markets and transmission was 
 
 295. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 
2011 ILL. L. REV. 145 (2011) (discussing the role of foundational facts to un-
derstanding doctrine, its underlying assumptions, and its evolution and 
change).  
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not viewed as critical for reliability and clean energy goals. For 
some states, inviting more participants to the decision-making 
process for constructing and operating transmission lines is in 
their economic interest—if not the interests of their incumbent 
utilities—particularly where a state has ample wind and solar 
resources that would benefit from energy exports, or faces high 
relative electricity prices (as does, for example, California) that 
could benefit from energy imports. To the extent procedural 
features such as bans on out-of-state applicants are merely a 
function of obsolete laws on the books, we would encourage 
state legislatures to revise those laws to remove language limit-
ing applicants to incumbent utilities, and grant siting and emi-
nent domain authority to all transmission lines that meet the 
criteria to obtain a certificate of need. The same is true for 
those states where the statute is ambiguous as to whether out-
of-state applicants and merchant lines can seek a siting permit 
or exercise eminent domain. Many of these states, which con-
stitute a majority, may make reference to “utilities” as appli-
cants, which does not make clear whether a merchant line can 
apply for some sort of “utility” status for purposes of building 
the line. These states can follow the lead of Montana, which 
clarified that all transmission lines may seek siting permits 
and exercise eminent domain authority, or Florida, which spe-
cifically includes “independent transmission systems” within 
the definition of an “electric utility” eligible to apply for siting 
permits and exercise eminent domain authority.
296
  
Through legislative, regulatory, and judicial actions, states 
can eliminate laws on their books that raise dormant Com-
merce Clause suspicions, and avoid future procedures that un-
constitutionally limit interstate transmission lines and entry to 
interstate markets by out-of-state applicants. In each of the 
situations we describe, there is no legitimate reason that out-of-
state firms or merchant transmission companies proposing to 
build interstate transmission lines should not be able to apply 
for certificates of need and exercise eminent domain authority 
if they can meet the economic, environmental, and other re-
quirements that in-state actors must meet in order to build 
such lines. In this sense, state PUCs and state courts still re-
tain significant authority to reject an application for economic 
or environmental reasons or find there is no public use for emi-
nent domain purposes based on market factors or other rea-
sons—but not based on whether the applicant is an incumbent 
utility or a new entrant coming from outside of the state. Thus, 
 
 296. FLA. STAT. § 403.522(12) (2015); see also supra note 228. 
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our approach retains state authority over physical energy in-
frastructure siting and eminent domain while removing exist-
ing state barriers that violate federalism principles under 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 
  CONCLUSION   
It would be a mistake for federal courts reviewing state 
regulatory regimes to embrace blanket deference under 
dormant Commerce Clause principles, especially in contexts 
where multi-state coordination is necessary for energy trans-
portation projects and climate initiatives to succeed. Such an 
approach only serves to encourage more state and local hold-
outs in addressing new energy infrastructure and challenging 
problems such as climate change, and is not true to federalism’s 
core value of promoting interstate coordination.  
Revitalizing dormant Commerce Clause review in this con-
text would allow courts to ensure that, at the very minimum, 
states allow for some consideration of out-of-state benefits in 
siting and eminent domain regimes. By giving a voice to con-
sumers and firms who otherwise would lack a role in a state’s 
political process, our proposed approach addresses the regula-
tory holdout problem and helps to reduce the likelihood that 
states will barricade themselves from energy infrastructure 
projects and interstate markets. More than approaches that 
link judicial deference and federalism and encourage each state 
to go it alone, our approach encourages states to coordinate 
with each other in the consideration of policies that produce 
benefits that transcend jurisdictional boundaries. Perhaps 
more than any other example where dormant Commerce 
Clause principles have been used to question state laws, the 
examples of siting and eminent domain in energy transporta-
tion infrastructure highlight how judicial scrutiny of state pro-
cedures and participation rights can also facilitate better coor-
dination in interstate commerce. 
Our approach is sensitive to concerns raised by critics of 
dormant Commerce Clause review, including some current Su-
preme Court Justices, who are skeptical about the institutional 
capacity of courts to balance costs and benefits in reviewing 
state regulations. Only a state legislature or regulator will be 
able to weigh the costs and benefits of a project and make the 
ultimate political choice to participate or not participate in a 
multi-state infrastructure project. This is a state prerogative 
and recognizes that politicians and regulators must evaluate 
the interests of citizens, landowners, and the environment as 
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they balance various considerations. But state regulators and 
courts should not be allowed to hide behind obsolete laws or 
practices, including entrenched and established procedures, 
that limit who can propose an interstate transmission line, who 
can intervene to oppose it, or what can be considered in weigh-
ing its merits. At a minimum, we maintain that a decision-
making framework must allow legislators or regulators to make 
a choice and that this choice must make some legitimate effort 
to balance the benefits of regional energy infrastructure and 
climate initiatives against the backdrop of interstate coordina-
tion. By contrast, applying strong judicial deference to state 
regulators under the banner of federalism only allows outdated 
regulatory regimes, practices, and procedures to encourage iso-
lationism and parochialism and serves to obstruct interstate 
coordination.  
A revitalized approach to dormant Commerce Clause re-
view also has some very practical consequences for state utility 
laws as well as the practices of regulators. It highlights the po-
tential legal vulnerability of many extant state siting and per-
mitting regimes, and especially procedures that are designed to 
favor the proposals or concerns of incumbent monopolists. It al-
so suggests how regulators and lawmakers can improve these 
regimes to better advance the goals of federalism and interstate 
power markets. Energy markets today have evolved far beyond 
the traditional utility model that developed in the twentieth 
century. In previous eras (when interstate power markets were 
very limited) it may have been consistent with federalism to al-
low states to isolate their power supply and demand from 
neighboring jurisdictions by embracing protections for incum-
bent utilities in the planning and construction of transmission 
lines. However, given the importance of interstate coordination 
to the operation of modern energy markets, state and local gov-
ernments should no longer be allowed to use existing utility 
and permitting laws to isolate energy markets and imperil the 
values of federalism. 
 
